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1. Network Formation
Abstract
We study network formation with n players and link cost α ą 0. After the net-
work is built, an adversary randomly deletes one link according to a certain
probability distribution. Cost for player v incorporates the expected number
of players to which v will become disconnected. We show existence of equi-
libria and a price of stability of 1+ o(1) under moderate assumptions on the
adversary and n ě 9.
As the main result, we prove bounds on the price of anarchy for two spe-
cial adversaries: one removes a link chosen uniformly at random, while the
other removes a link that causes a maximum number of player pairs to be
separated. For unilateral link formation we show a bound of O(1) on the price
of anarchy for both adversaries, the constant being bounded by 10+ o(1) and
8+ o(1), respectively. For bilateral link formation we show O(1+
√
n/α) for
one adversary (if α ą 12 ), and Θ(n) for the other (if α ą 2 considered con-
stant and n ě 9). The latter is the worst that can happen for any adversary
in this model (if α = Ω(1)). This points out substantial differences between
unilateral and bilateral link formation.
1 Network Formation
In network formation, a multitude of individuals, called players, form a network
in such a way that each player decides for herself to which other players she
would like to connect. So players can be considered vertices1 of a (to-be-built)
network. Any outcome of this, i. e., any network, can be evaluated from the point
of view of each player via an individual cost. Individual cost comprises building
cost, proportional to the number of links2 built by the player, and indirect cost,
which expresses properties of the network. Social cost is the sum of individual
cost over all players. There are two parameters: n is the number of players and
α ą 0 is the cost of a link. Another crucial feature is how links can be formed:
unilaterally or bilaterally. Under unilateral link formation a player can connect to
any other player and is charged the amount of α for each link. Under bilateral link
formation, the consent of both endpoints is required and if they both agree, then
they pay α each. When the network is so that no player sees a way to improve
her individual cost, we speak of an equilibrium. The finer facets of the equilibrium
concept have to be chosen according to the link formation rule: Nash equilibrium
is well suited for unilateral link formation, whereas for bilateral link formation,
1We use “player” and “vertex” synonymously.
2We use “link” and “edge” synonymously.
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pairwise Nash equilibrium or pairwise stability are better suited; definitions will be
given later. When the social cost is minimal, we speak of an optimum.3 The price
of anarchy [KP99, Pap01] measures overall performance loss due to distributed
operation, compared to when a central authority would enforce an optimum: the
price of anarchy is the worst-case ratio of the social cost of an equilibrium to that
of an optimum. One is interested in bounds on the price of anarchy, especially
upper bounds. The price of anarchy is a static measure in the sense that it does
not try to assess how a network might evolve over time. It instead builds upon the
assumption that equilibrium networks will emerge from evolutionary processes.
A related concept is price of stability, i. e., the best-case ratio of the social cost of
an equilibrium to that of an optimum. This work’s focus is on upper bounds on
the price of anarchy, although we prove tight bounds on the price of stability and
some structural results along the way.
Our Contribution. We study the price of anarchy in an adversary model. After the
network is built, an adversary deletes exactly one link from it. The adversary is
modeled by a random experiment; hence in general there is an uncertainty which
link will be deleted, but players know the probability distribution according to
which the adversary chooses the link to destroy. Indirect cost of a player v is
defined as the expected number of players to which v will lose connection when
the adversary strikes. Formally, an adversary is a mapping from networks to
probability distributions on the edges of the particular network.
Although it appears limiting that the adversary can only destroy one link, this
model already is challenging to analyze. It is a contribution to the understanding
of how networks are formed when it is important that every vertex can reach every
other vertex, for example for data transmission or delivery of goods.
After preparations and discussion of related work (Section 2 to Section 5) we
start out with a simple O(1 + nα ) bound on the price of anarchy for any adver-
sary and independent of the link formation rule and the equilibrium concept, but
under the assumption that equilibria only have a linear (in n) number of edges
(Section 6). This assumption will later be shown to be valid for the two special ad-
versaries under consideration and unilateral link formation. In the three sections
that follow (Section 7 to Section 9), we consider unilateral link formation. We con-
structively show existence of Nash equilibria under some moderate assumptions
on the adversary and n ě 9, including a co-existence of two very different topolo-
3Optimal networks are also called “efficient” in the literature.
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gies for the same range of parameters. A 1+ o(1) bound on the price of stability
follows from our existence results. Then for two specific adversaries we improve
theO(1+ nα ) bound on the price of anarchy toO(1). These two adversaries are cho-
sen to represent extreme cases: the first one, called simple-minded, chooses one link
uniformly at random. The second one, called smart, chooses uniformly at random
from the set of those links whose removal causes a maximum number of vertex
pairs to be separated. The proof techniques for the simple-minded adversary are
roughly similar to what has been used for other models before, e. g., [FLM+03],
namely we relate to the diameter of equilibria. For the smart adversary, a new
approach has to be taken; it works by an appropriate decomposition of the graph.
Finally, we consider bilateral link formation (Section 10). The constructions
done in Section 7 for unilateral link formation carry over with little effort, and so
does the bound on the price of stability. For the simple-minded adversary, we
show an O(1+
√
n/α) bound on the price of anarchy if α ą 12 and O(1+
√
n/α1.5)
otherwise. For the smart adversary, we show an O(1+ nα ) upper bound and an
Ω(1+ nα ) lower bound, the latter requiring α ą 2 and n ě 9. So if α is considered a
constant and α ą 2 (and n ě 9), the price of anarchy for the smart adversary jumps
from O(1) to the worst possible, namely Ω(n), when switching from unilateral to
bilateral link formation.
We also consider convexity of cost. This is important for the relation between
the two equilibrium concepts used for bilateral link formation. If cost is convex,
then pairwise Nash equilibrium and pairwise stability are equivalent. We prove
convexity for the simple-minded adversary. For the smart adversary, we disprove
convexity; yet we have to leave open the adjacent question whether pairwise Nash
equilibrium and pairwise stability in fact diverge in this case.
Open Problems. Tight bounds on the price of anarchy for other adversaries, or
for a general adversary are left for future work. As one of the most intriguing
open problems, we leave the case of an adversary removing more than one link.
Since our proofs rely heavily on the restriction of only one link being removed, this
is expected to be a new challenge. Finally, the jump from O(1) to Ω(n) induced
by a switch from unilateral to bilateral link formation raises the question how our
model behaves with other link formation rules e. g., in the recently introduced
models with transfers [BJ07].
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2 Model Framework
We give a rigorous description of the model framework that will be used in the
following. Let n ě 3 and V a set of n vertices, say V = [n] := {1, . . . , n}. Each
vertex represents an individual, called a player. Each player names a list of other
players to which she would like to build an edge. The decisions of player v are
collected in a vector Sv P {0, 1}n, with Svw = 1 meaning that v would like to
have the edge {v,w} in the network. Such an Sv is called a strategy for player v.
A vector of strategies S = (S1, . . . , Sn), one for each player, is called a strategy
profile. A strategy profile can be written as a matrix {0, 1}nˆn and interpreted as
the adjacency matrix of a directed graph ~G(S) = (V,~E(S)). Then (v,w) P ~E(S) if
and only if player v would like to have the edge {v,w}. We will often work with
this representation of strategy profiles. Denote S(n) the set of all strategy profiles
for n players. We use sets F Ď VˆV to denote strategy changes. Define S+ F and
S´ F by setting for all x, y P V
(S+ F)xy :=
{
1 if (x, y) P F
Sxy otherwise
and (S´ F)xy :=
{
0 if (x, y) P F
Sxy otherwise
.
If F = {(v,w)}, we write S+ (v,w) and S´ (v,w). For instance, S+ (v,w) means
that we add to S the request of player v for the edge {v,w}.
The graph which is actually built is called the final graph and denoted G(S).
We are interested in two different versions of the final graph:
Ź The unilateral final graph, denoted GU(S) := (V, EU(S)), where
EU(S) := {{v,w} ; Svw = 1_ Swv = 1} .
So the wish of one endpoint, either v or w, is enough to have {v,w} in the final
graph. We also call this unilateral link formation (ULF). Throughout Section 7 to
Section 9 we will only consider ULF.
Ź The bilateral final graph, denoted GB(S) := (V, EB(S)), where
EB(S) := {{v,w} ; Svw = 1^ Swv = 1} .
So both endpoints, v and w, have to agree on having {v,w} in the final graph.
Otherwise, it will not be built. We also call this bilateral link formation (BLF). We
will consider BLF in Section 10.
We omit the “U” and “B” superscripts when a statement or definition addresses
both versions, or when a restriction to a particular version is clear from context.
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We speak of selling (or deleting, removing) an edge e if a player changes her
strategy so that e is no longer part of the final graph. We speak of buying (or
adding, building) an edge e if a player changes her strategy so that e is then part of
the final graph.
Fix parameters n and α ą 0. Given a strategy profile S P S(n) each player expe-
riences a cost Cv(S), her individual cost. It is comprised of building cost plus indirect
cost. Building cost is computed by counting α for each edge that v requested.4 In-
direct cost can be defined in many different ways and usually captures properties
of the final graph, we denote it Iv(G(S)) and sometimes just Iv(S) for a stream-
lined notation. Denoting |Sv| := ∑wPV Svw, we can write out the individual cost
Cv(S) := |Sv| α + Iv(G(S)). An equivalent concept found in the literature is payoff :
properties of the final graph are expressed by income, and payoff is income minus
building cost.
The indirect cost Iv(¨) is a placeholder to be filled in in order to have a concrete
model. For example, the model in [FLM+03] uses Iv(G) = ∑wPV distG(v,w), where
the distance dist(v,w) is the length of a shortest path between v and w and equals
8 if there is no such path. We call this the sum-distance model. The price of anarchy
in the sum-distance model is particularly well-studied. We will introduce our
definition of indirect cost in Section 3.
We call indirect cost anonymous if for each final graph G = (V, E) and each
graph automorphism φ : V ÝÑ V of G, we have Iv(G) = Iφ(v)(G) for all v P V.
In other words, anonymity of indirect cost means that Iv(G) does not depend on
v’s identity, but only on v’s position in the final graph G. This is of importance
in particular if G has symmetry. For instance, if G is a cycle, then all vertices
experience the same indirect cost. If G is a path, then both endpoints experience
the same indirect cost.
The social cost of S is C(S) := ∑vPV Cv(S). When we sum up the building
cost over all players, we also speak of total building cost; when we sum up the
indirect cost over all players, we speak of total indirect cost. Hence social cost is
total building cost plus total indirect cost. A strategy profile S˚ is called optimal
if C(S˚) = minSPS(n) C(S). This is with respect to fixed α; denote OPT(n, α) the
social cost of an optimum for given n and α. An undirected graph G is called
optimal if G = G(S˚) for an optimal S˚.
A strategy profile S is called essential5 if for all v,w P V the following implica-
4This deviates from the definition in [Kli10b]. However, for essential strategy profiles (defined
below), the definitions given here and in [Kli10b] coincide.
5The “essential” term was used in [BG00b] in the context of ULF. In [CG07], the concept is called
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tion holds: Svw = 1 ùñ Swv = 0 when using ULF, and Svw = 1 ùñ Swv = 1 when
using BLF. In other words, an essential strategy profile does not contain unneces-
sary or useless requests, respectively. In an essential strategy profile, building cost
deserves its name in the following sense: players pay only for edges that would
not be in the final graph without this payment (relevant for ULF) and which ac-
tually appear in the final graph (relevant for BLF). This means that in ULF, each
edge in the final graph is paid for α by exactly one of its endpoints, namely the one
who requested it. In BLF, each edge in the final graph is paid for α by each of its
endpoints. Hence if S is essential then with ULF C(S) = |E(S)| α + ∑vPV Iv(G(S)),
and with BLF C(S) = 2|E(S)| α + ∑vPV Iv(G(S)). Social cost then only depends on
the final graph. In BLF, an essential S is fully determined by its final graph G(S).
For each strategy profile S, dropping all unnecessary or useless requests results
in an essential strategy profile S1 with the same final graph and with the same or
a smaller individual cost for each player. Moreover, it is easy to see that if S is an
equilibrium of any of the three kinds introduced below, then S1 is an equilibrium
of the same kind. It is hence reasonable to restrict to essential strategy profiles,
and we will do so in the following.
ULF and BLF are similar regarding link removal: in both, if v pays for a link e,
then v can have the link removed unilaterally, i. e., by changing her strategy whilst
the strategies of all other players are maintained. (For ULF, we rely on the restric-
tion to essential strategy profiles here.) ULF and BLF are different regarding link
formation: there is no way for v to form a link unilaterally when BLF is in effect.
(We rely on the restriction to essential strategy profiles again here.) However, with
ULF, a player can form any link unilaterally.
Recall that we can specify strategy profiles as directed graphs. Furthermore,
since the social cost is fully determined by the final graph (since we restrict to
essential strategy profiles), it suffices to consider the final graph (which is an undi-
rected graph) in places where only the social cost is relevant. It is also sufficient to
consider the final graph when dealing with BLF, since the final graph under BLF
fully specifies the underlying strategy profile (restricting to essential ones).
A strategy profile S is called a Nash equilibrium (NE) if no player can strictly
improve her individual cost by changing her strategy given the strategies of the
other players, i. e.,
Cv(S+ A´D) ě Cv(S) @A,D Ď {v}ˆV @v P V .
“non-superfluous” in the context of BLF. In [Kli10b], “clean” was used the way we use “essential”
here.
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Denote the set of all NE for given n and α by NE(n, α). An undirected graph G is
called a NE if there exists a NE S such that G = G(S). The price of anarchy (with
respect to NE) is the social cost of a worst-case NE divided by the social cost of an
optimum, i. e., maxSPNE(n,α) C(S)
OPT(n, α)
.
When we replace “max” for “min”, we speak of price of stability. Both notions are
meant relative to a given n and α. They extend naturally to other equilibrium
concepts, instead of NE.
We use NE as equilibrium concept for ULF. However, NE is not an adequate
equilibrium concept for BLF. With BLF, the empty graph is a NE regardless of
other properties of the model, since link formation cannot happen unilaterally.
This not only appears unreasonable, it also trivially pushes the price of anarchy to
8 for many models, including the sum-distance model. A remedy is to introduce
a minimum of cooperation: absence of a link from the final graph requires the
additional justification that adding this link would be an impairment to at least
one of its endpoints. Otherwise it shall be built. This is formalized in the following
definition. A strategy profile S is called a pairwise Nash equilibrium (PNE) if it is a
NE and for all v,w P V such that {v,w} R E(S) the following implication holds:6
Cv(S+ (v,w) + (w, v)) ď Cv(S) ùñ Cw(S+ (v,w) + (w, v)) ą Cw(S) . (2.1)
We call an undirected graph G a PNE if there exists a strategy profile S being a
PNE and G = G(S).
A related concept is pairwise stability (PS). A strategy profile S is called pairwise
stable (PS) if condition (2.1) holds for all {v,w} R E(S) and if for all {v,w} P E(S):7
Cv(S´ (v,w)) ě Cv(S) and Cw(S´ (w, v)) ě Cw(S) .
We call an undirected graph G PS if there exists a strategy profile S being PS and
G = G(S). So, with PS, only single-link deviations have to be considered.
Wemake the convention that whenever we speak of NE (or MaxNE, introduced
below), we mean that relative to ULF. Whenever we speak of PNE or PS, we mean
that relative to BLF.
6This can also be found in the literature with strict inequality in the premise. Both variants have
their advantages and disadvantages. The advantage of ours is that it rules out the empty strategy
profile as PNE whenever indirect cost8 is assigned to disconnected final graphs. A disadvantage is
that in order to relate NE to PNE, as we will do in Section 10, a refinement of NE is required, which
we call “maximal Nash equilibrium” (MaxNE). It will be introduced later.
7In fact, one of the two conditions, say Cv(S´ (v,w)) ě Cv(S), clearly suffices.
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Clearly, a PNE is also PS, and so for fixed n and α, the price of anarchy with
respect to PNE is upper-bounded by the price of anarchy with respect to PS. The
converse holds if cost is convex on the set of PS strategy profiles. Convexity of
cost relates removal of multiple links to removal of each of those links alone. This
addresses the difference between PNE and PS: in the former, removal of multiple
links has to be considered, whereas the latter is only concerned with removal of
single links. Let v P V and S a strategy profile. We call Cv convex in S if for all
{w1, . . . ,wk} Ď V we have
Cv
(
S´ (v,w1)´ . . .´ (v,wk)
)
´ Cv(S) ě
k
∑
i=1
(
Cv(S´ (v,wi))´ Cv(S)
)
,
or, equivalently,
Iv
(
S´ (v,w1)´ . . .´ (v,wk)
)
´ Iv(S) ě
k
∑
i=1
(
Iv(S´ (v,wi))´ Iv(S)
)
. (2.2)
We call Cv convex on a set of strategy profiles S , if it is convex in every S P S . We
call Cv convex if it is convex on S(n), i. e., the set of all strategy profiles for the given
number n of players. We say that “cost is convex” if Cv is convex for each player
v. It was shown by Corbo and Parkes [CP05], their proof being based on a result
by Calvó-Armengol and I˙lkiliç [CAI˙05], that cost is convex in the sum-distance
model. Hence, in the sum-distance model PNE and PS coincide.
For both, PNE and PS, condition (2.1) implies that if indirect cost8 is assigned
to a disconnected final graph, all PNE and PS graphs are connected. (The same
holds for NE.)
To study the relation between NE (with ULF) and PNE (with BLF) we need
a refinement of NE, not widely known in the literature. We call a NE S a max-
imal Nash equilibrium (MaxNE) if Cv(S + (v,w1) + . . . + (v,wk)) ą Cv(S) for all
{v,w1} , . . . , {v,wk} R E(S). That is, we exclude the possibility that a player can
buy additional links so that the gain in her indirect cost and the additional build-
ing cost nullify each other. We will require this notion in Section 10.
2.3 Remark. A NE S is maximal if indirect cost Iv(S) has its minimum possible
value for all players v (which is 0 for most models). A NE is also maximal, if there
exists ε ą 0 such that it is still a NE for link cost α´ ε instead of α. Hence, if S
is a NE for all α ě f (n), for some function f , this implies that S is a MaxNE for
all α ą f (n).
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We require some basic graph-theoretic notions. Let an undirected graph G =
(V, E) be given, that is, V is a finite set and E Ď (V2). A walk of length ℓ is a
sequence of vertices W = (v0, . . . , vℓ) such that {vi´1, vi} P E for all i P [ℓ]. Denote
V(W) := {v0, . . . , vℓ} its vertices and E(W) := {{vi´1, vi} ; i P [ℓ]} its edges. The
walk is called a path if all its vertices are distinct, that is, if |V(W)| = ℓ+ 1. The
walk is called a cycle if it has at least length 3 (i. e., ℓ ě 3) and all its vertices except
the last are distinct (i. e., |{v0, . . . , vℓ´1}| = ℓ) and the walk is closed (i. e., v0 =
vℓ). Sometimes we use a notation that gives names to the edges in the walk, like
(v0, e1, v1, e2, . . . , eℓ, vℓ). If C is a cycle and e = {u,w} is an edge with u,w P V(C)
but e R E(C), we call e a chord. For a subset W Ď V denote G[W] := (W, (W2 )X E)
the induced subgraph of W, or the subgraph induced by W. If G is a graph, then
V(G) denotes its set of vertices and E(G) its set of edges; this is useful when G
was not introduced writing “G = (V, E)”. More graph-theoretic notions will be
introduced along the way as we need them.
One might suggest using multigraphs instead of graphs, since in our adversary
model, connectivity under removal of edges is relevant. However, none of our
results becomes false when we allow multigraphs. Where not obvious, a remark
on this is made. So we can stick to the simpler notion of graphs.
In order to not have to introduce names for all occurring constants, we use
“O” and “Ω” notation. For our results, we use this notation in the following
understanding (it does not necessarily apply to all cited results). We write “x =
O(y)” if there exists a constant c ą 0 such that x ď cy. The constant may only
depend on other constants and is in particular independent of the non-constant
quantities that constitute x and y, e. g., parameters n and α. We do not implicitly
require that some quantities, e. g., n, have to be large. Analogously, we write
“x = Ω(y)” if there exists a constant c ą 0 such that x ě cy. Note that “O”
indicates an upper bound, making no statement about a lower bound; while “Ω”
indicates a lower bound, making no statement about an upper bound. We write
x = Θ(y) if x = O(y) and x = Ω(y); the constants used in the “O” and the “Ω”
statement may be different, of course.
The “o” notation is only used in one form, namely o(1) substituting a quantity
that tends to 0 when n tends to infinity, regardless whether other parameters are
fixed or not. Whenever we write “o(1)” in an expression, it is meant as an upper
bound, making no statement about a lower bound.
11
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3 Adversary Model
An adversary A is a mapping assigning to each graph G = (V, E) a probability
measure PrAG on the edges E of G. Given a connected graph G, the relevance of
an edge e for a player v is the number of vertices that can, starting at v, only be
reached via e. We denote the relevance by relG(e, v) and the sum of all relevances
for a player by RG(v) := ∑ePE relG(e, v). An edge of a connected graph is called
a bridge if its removal destroys connectivity, or equivalently, if it is no part of any
cycle. The relevance relG(e, v) is 0 iff e is not a bridge. Given a strategy profile S
where G(S) is connected, we define the individual cost of a player v by
Cv(S) := |Sv| α + ∑
ePE(S)
relG(S)(e, v) Pr
A
G(S)({e}) .
The indirect cost is the expected number of vertices to which v will lose connection
when exactly one edge is removed from G(S) randomly and according to the
probability measure given by the adversary A. For this indirect cost, we use
the term disconnection cost in the following instead of “indirect cost”. We define
the indirect cost to be 8 when G(S) is not connected, so we can concentrate on
connected graphs in our study of optima and equilibria. We usually omit the
“G(S)” subscripts and also the “A” superscript; we also write “E” instead of “E(S)”
and “m” for the number of edges, i. e., m = |E(S)|.
Remark. Since 8 is assigned to disconnected final graphs, optima, NE, and PS
graphs are connected.
Proof. This is clear for optima and also for NE (under ULF): since a connected
graph has finite indirect cost, a player would always choose to build enough links
in order to make the graph connected. For PS (under BLF) it is a consequence of
having non-strict inequality in the premise of (2.1).
The separation of an edge e, denoted sep(e), is the number of ordered vertex
pairs that will be separated by the removal of e. For a bridge e, denote ν(e) the
number of vertices in the component of G ´ e that has a minimum number of
vertices; we have ν(e) ď ⌊ n2 ⌋. If e is not a bridge, we define ν(e) := 0. Then
sep(e) = 2ν(e) (n ´ ν(e)) and also sep(e) = ∑vPV rel(e, v). If e is a bridge, then
sep(e) ě 2 (n ´ 1). We can express the social cost now (total building cost given
for ULF):
C(S) := ∑
vPV
Cv(S) = m α + ∑
vPV
∑
ePE
rel(e, v)Pr({e}) = m α + ∑
ePE
sep(e)Pr({e}) .
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We call an adversary symmetric if for a fixed graph, the probability of an edge
only depends on its separation, i. e., sep(e) = sep(e1) implies Pr({e}) = Pr({e1})
for all e, e1. The following proposition is proved straightforwardly.
3.1 Proposition. A symmetric adversary induces anonymous disconnection cost.
Proof. Let G = (V, E) be connected and φ : V ÝÑ V a graph automorphism of G.
If e = {v,w} is a non-bridge, then φ(e) := {φ(v), φ(w)} is a non-bridge as well,
and so sep(e) = 0 = sep(φ(e)) and rel(e, v) = 0 = rel(φ(e), φ(v)) for all v P V.
Let e = {v,w} be a bridge and G1, G2 be the two components of G ´ e. Then
φ(e) is a bridge as well. Let G11, G
1
2 be the two components of G ´ φ(e). Then
φ(V(Gi)) = V(G
1
i) for all i P {1, 2}, or φ(V(Gi)) = V(G1j) for all i, j P {1, 2}, i ‰ j.
In either case, sep(e) = sep(φ(e)), and also rel(e, v) = rel(φ(e), φ(v)) for all v P V.
In total, we have for all e P E and all v P V:
sep(e) = sep(φ(e)) (3.2)
rel(e, v) = rel(φ(e), φ(v)) (3.3)
Let v P V. Then:
Iφ(v)(G) = ∑
ePE
rel(e, φ(v))Pr({e})
= ∑
ePE
rel(φ(e), φ(v))Pr({φ(e)}) φ is bijective
= ∑
ePE
rel(e, v)Pr({φ(e)}) by (3.3)
= ∑
ePE
rel(e, v)Pr({e}) by (3.2) and symmetric adversary
= Iv(G) .
The converse of Proposition 3.1 does not hold, as shown in Figure 1 on the fol-
lowing page. Proposition 3.1 is useful since symmetry can be recognized directly
from the definitions of the two special adversaries studied later, and so we know
that they induce anonymous disconnection cost.
4 Related Work
There is a vast body of literature on game-theoretic network formation, by far not
limited to studies of the price of anarchy. A good starting point is the survey by
Jackson [Jac04] from 2004. We cite several publications below with a bias towards
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u v w
2/3 1/3
Figure 1. Let this be the final graph G = (V, E) and G1 the subgraph to the left starting
with u (i. e., the cycle on 5 vertices), and G2 the subgraph to the right starting with w. Let
the adversary assign probabilities, say Pr({{u, v}}) := 2/3 and Pr({{v,w}}) := 1/3 and 0
to all other edges. Then all players in G1 experience the same disconnection cost, and the
same holds for G2. (Precisely, we have Ix(G) = 2/3 ¨ 6+ 1/3 ¨ 5 = 4+ 5/3 for all x P V(G1)
and Iy(G) = 1/3 ¨ 6+ 2/3 ¨ 5 = 2+ 10/3 for all y P V(G2) and Iv(G) = 2/3 ¨ 5+ 1/3 ¨ 5 =
5.) The adversary is not symmetric, since sep({u, v}) = 5 ¨ 6 = sep({v,w}). However,
disconnection cost is anonymous, since an automorphism can only permute players within
G1 and G2, respectively.
studies of the price of anarchy. In a separate subsection on page 18, we give
a detailed comparison of our model with work being particularly related to it,
namely [CFSK04, JW96, BS08, SH03, HS05, BG00a].
Bilateral link formation follows a concept given by Myerson [Mye02] in a dif-
ferent context. We quote [Mye02, p. 228], emphasis added:
Now consider a link-formation process in which each player independently
writes down a list of players with whom he wants to form a link, and the
payoff allocation is the fair allocation above for the graph that contains a link
for every pair of players that have named each other.
Jackson and Wolinsky [JW96] in 1996 introduced the symmetric connections
model and the equilibrium concept of pairwise stability. The symmetric connec-
tions model is best described using the notions of income and payoff. The income
for player v is ∑wPV
w‰v
δdistG(S)(v,w), where δ P (0, 1) is a parameter. Her payoff is
income minus building cost. Note that we have an exponential dependence on
distance. This models to some extent that each link has a probability of 1´ δ for
failure. We will elaborate on this later.
Jackson andWolinsky discussed several variations of PS, including what would
later be known as PNE. We quote [JW96, p. 67]:
Another possible strengthening of the stability notion would allow for richer
14
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combinations of moves to threaten the stability of a network. Note that the
basic stability notion we have considered requires only that a network be
immune to one deviating action at a time. It is not required that a network be
immune to more complicated deviations, such as a simultaneous severance of
some existing links and an introduction of a new link by two players [..].
Watts [Wat01] in 2001 studied the symmetric connections model with an ex-
tended equilibrium concept: a graph is considered stable if no player wishes to
sell any link and if no two players wish to establish an additional link while delet-
ing any number of their links. Calvó-Armengol and I˙lkiliç [CAI˙05] and Corbo and
Parkes [CP05] in 2005 discussed different equilibrium concepts and their relations:
PNE, PS, and proper equilibrium [Mye02]. In [CAI˙05], among other results, it was
shown that the symmetric connections model has convex cost.
Bloch and Jackson [BJ07] in 2007 introduced a model with transfers: each
player v decides how much she is willing to pay for a link {v,w} or how much she
would demand the other endpoint w to pay for the link. If v offers at least as much
as w demands, or vice versa, the link {v,w} is established in the final graph. Ap-
propriate equilibrium concepts were introduced and discussed. Bloch and Jackson
also compared PS, PNE, and their transfer model in a separate publication [BJ06].
Bala and Goyal [BG00a] in 2000 and in a unilateral setting studied a model
where players wish to be connected by a path to as many other players as possible,
but path lengths are unimportant. They also considered a unilateral version of the
symmetric connections model. In another publication [BG00b] in the same year,
they extended the first model by allowing each link to fail with a probability 1´ p.
Haller and Sarangi [SH03, HS05] in 2003 extended this model again by allowing
each link {v,w} to fail with its own probability 1´ pvw. We will elaborate on this
later.
Anshelevich, Dasgupta, Tardos, and Wexler [ADTW08] in 2003 studied the
price of anarchy and algorithmic aspects of a model in which each player has
a set of terminals and aims to construct a network which connects her termi-
nals. For a related model, Anshelevich, Dasgupta, Kleinberg, Tardos, Wexler,
and Roughgarden [ADK+04] in 2004 studied the price of stability. Also in 2004,
Christin and Chuang [CC05] studied a model for network formation with an ex-
tended cost function modeling peer-to-peer networks, and Christin, Grossklags,
and Chuang [CGC04] looked at it under the aspect of different game-theoretic
principles.
Chun, Fonseca, Stoica, and Kubiatowicz [CFSK04] in 2004 experimentally stud-
ied an extended version of the sum-distance model.
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Johari, Mannor, and Tsitsiklis [JMT06] in 2006 studied a model in which each
vertex wishes to send a given amount of traffic to some of the other vertices, and
only cares whether the traffic eventually arrives at the destination. There is a
handling cost at each vertex, which is proportional to the amount of traffic through
that vertex.
The work of Fabrikant, Luthra, Maneva, Papadimitriou, and Shenker [FLM+03]
from 2003 is to the best of the author’s knowledge the first quantitative study of
the price of anarchy in a model that fits into the framework considered here, as
per Section 2. They considered the unilateral sum-distance model and proved a
bound of max {1, O(√α)} on the price of anarchy in general, and an O(1) bound
for α ą (n´1) n2 . They conjectured that for α = Ω(1), all non-transient NE were
trees – the Tree Conjecture. A NE is called transient when there exists a sequence
of strategy changes in which each player changing her strategy maintains her in-
dividual cost, and finally a strategy profile is reached which is not a NE anymore.
The Tree Conjecture was based on the observation that all NE constructed so far
at that time, for α ą 2, were trees or transient ones (namely the Petersen graph for
α ď 4). The Tree Conjecture was later, in 2006, disproved by Albers, Eilts, Even-
Dar, Mansour, and Roditty [AEED+06] by showing that for each n0, there exists a
non-transient NE on n ě n0 vertices containing cycles, for any 1 ă α ď
√
n/2.
Corbo and Parkes [CP05] in 2005 considered the bilateral version of the sum-
distance model. They showed an O(
√
α) bound for 1 ď α ă n2 on the price of
anarchy. As noticed later in 2007 by Demaine et al. [DHMZ07], the proof in fact
yields O(min {√α, n/√α}).
Albers et al. [AEED+06] in 2006 not only disproved the Tree Conjecture, but
also improved the bounds on the price of anarchy for the unilateral sum-distance
model: they gave constant upper bounds for α = O(
√
n) and α ě 12n⌈log n⌉, as
well as an upper bound for any α of
15 (1+ (min {α2/n, n2/α})1/3) .
AnO(1) upper bound for α = O(
√
n)was also independently proved by Lin [Lin03].
These bounds were again improved by Demaine, Hajiaghayi, Mahini, and Zadi-
moghaddam [DHMZ07] in 2007. They showed a bound of 2O(
√
log n) for any α and
a constant bound for α = O(n1´ε) for any constant ε ą 0. For the bilateral version,
they proved the O(min {√α, n/√α}) bound of Corbo and Parkes tight. Recently,
in 2010, Mihalák and Schlegel [MS10] proved that for the unilateral sum-distance
model and α ě 273n, all equilibria are trees, which implies a constant bound on
16
4. Related Work
the price of anarchy in that range of α.
Moscibroda, Schmid, and Wattenhofer [MSW06] in 2006 studied the price of
anarchy in a variation of the sum-distance model where the distance between two
vertices is generalized, that is, it may be given by any metric. The cost function
uses the stretch, that is the actual distance in the constructed graph divided by the
distance that a direct connection would provide. Halevi and Mansour [HM07] in
2007 studied the price of anarchy in the sum-distance model under the generaliza-
tion that each player has a list of “friends”, that is, a list of other vertices and she
is only interested in her distance to those. Demaine et al. in [DHMZ07] in 2007
also considered the max-distance model: indirect cost for v is maxwPV dist(v,w).
Upper bounds were shown for ULF and tight bounds for BLF. For ULF, improved
bounds were recently shown in [MS10].
Brandes, Hoefer, and Nick [BHN08] in 2008 studied a variant of the sum-
distance model assigning a finite distance to pairs of disconnected players, al-
lowing for disconnected equilibria. They proved structural properties and bounds
on the price of anarchy. Laoutaris, Poplawski, Rajaraman, Sundaram, and Teng
[LPR+08] in 2008 considered bounded budget connection games, a variant of the sum-
distance model with player-dependent link costs, lengths, and preferences w(u, v)
expressing the importance for player u of having a good connection to player v,
and finally a budget for each player limiting the number of links that this player
can build. They considered existence of equilibria and proved bounds on the price
of anarchy and stability. An important special case is the uniform version, which
has link costs, link lengths, and preferences all equal, and also all players have
the same limit on their budget. Recently, this uniform version was also studied
by Demaine and Zadimoghaddam [DZ10]. They proved a tight upper bound and,
more importantly, showed how to induce equilibria with small social cost. They
used a technique called public service advertising, previously studied for different
games by Balcan, Blum, and Mansour [BBM09].
Baumann and Stiller [BS08] in 2008 considered the price of anarchy in the
symmetric connections model. Demaine et al. [DHMZ09] in 2009 studied the price
of anarchy in a cooperative variant of the sum-distance model. They also looked
at the case that links can only be formed for certain pairs of vertices, that is, the
underlying “host” graph needs not to be a complete one.
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Comparison of Our Model with Related Work
Our adversary model addresses robustness in a way that – to the best of the au-
thor’s knowledge – has not been studied theoretically before. We compare our
approach to previous work that also addresses robustness.
Chun, Fonseca, Stoica, and Kubiatowicz [CFSK04] experimentally studied an
extended version of the sum-distance model and considered robustness. To sim-
ulate failures, they removed some vertices randomly. To simulate attacks, they
removed vertices starting with those having highest degree.
The symmetric connections model of Jackson and Wolinsky [JW96] can also be
interpreted from a robustness point-of-view. Recall that in the symmetric connec-
tions model there is a parameter δ P (0, 1), and payoff piv(S) for player v under
strategy profile S is defined
piv(S) := ∑
wPV
w‰v
δdistG(S)(v,w)´ |Sv| α .
An interpretation is that v receives one unit of income from each other vertex
w along a shortest path between v and w. However, each link has a probability
1´ δ of failure, so the expected income from w is the probability that none of the
distG(S)(v,w) links fails, which is δ
distG(S)(v,w) if we assume stochastic independence
of failures. For BLF, Baumann and Stiller [BS08] gave an expression for the exact
price of anarchy for α P (δ´ δ2, δ´ δ3), which implies an O(1) bound (the constant
being bounded by 41+2δ ). The price of anarchy is 1 for α ă δ ´ δ
2, following
from [JW96]. The price of anarchy in the range α ą δ´ δ3 is not fully understood
yet.
The symmetric connections model is different from ours in many respects:
Ź All links have the same probability of failure. In our model, links can have
different probabilities, and these may even depend on the final graph.8
Ź The failure of a link e and the failure of a link f are independent events for
e ‰ f , at least along the concerned paths. In our model, the failures of e and f
are mutually exclusive events.
Ź Alternative paths are not considered; it is assumed that routing happens along
a specific shortest path that is fixed before the random experiment that models
8However, large parts of our analysis will be restricted to two specific cases: one in which the
adversary picks a link uniformly at random (simple-minded adversary) and another in which he
picks a link that causes maximum overall damage (smart adversary).
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the link failures is conducted. In our model, all paths are considered. However,
we do not consider path lengths.
Bala and Goyal [BG00b] studied a variation of the symmetric connections
model, which is closer to ours. In their model, each vertex receives an amount
of 1 from each vertex it is connected to via some path. Each link has a probability
1´ p of failure, p P [0, 1] being the same for all links and independent of the final
graph. Failures of two distinct links are stochastically independent. Income of
a vertex v is the expected number of vertices to which v is connected via a path.
Unilateral link formation is used. They considered structural properties of optima
and NE, in particular pointing out cases where NE are “super-connected”, i. e.,
connected and not containing bridges. They also showed that for some regions of
parameters, there exist NE that are also optima (i. e., they show a price of stability
of 1 for these regions).
Haller and Sarangi [SH03, HS05] studied an extension of the model of Bala and
Goyal [BG00b]. In their model, each link {v,w} may fail with its own probability
1´ pvw. They also considered structural properties of optima and NE as well as
relations of optima and NE, including the price of stability similar to [BG00b].
Like the symmetric connections model, their model shows several differences to
ours:
Ź The failure probability of each link {v,w} is 1´ pvw, independent of the final
graph.9 In our model, failure probabilities depend on the final graph.
Ź Failures of two different links are stochastically independent. In our model,
they are mutually exclusive events. (This difference is exactly as between the
symmetric connections model and ours.)
Generally, independent link failures model the unavailability of links due to,
e. g., deterioration, maintenance times, or influences affecting the whole infrastruc-
ture or large parts of it (e. g., natural disasters). Our adversary model, on the other
hand, models the situation when faced with an entity that is malicious but only
has limited means so that it can only destroy a limited number of links (we limit
this number to 1 in this work).
9Haller and Sarangi also briefly discussed failure probabilities depending on the final graph.
They considered an example where for non-increasing functions fv(¨) and parameters Pvw the prob-
abilities are defined pvw(S) := fv(degG(S)(v)) fw(degG(S)(w)) Pvw if v and w have a link between
them, and 0 otherwise.
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5 The Bridge Tree
We conduct some preparations for the analysis of equilibria in our adversary
model, which will be useful regardless of the link formation rule and the equilib-
rium concept. In the end, in Lemma 5.3, we will have developed a simple method
to bound the sum of relevances R(v) for each player v, which will later help to
bound the disconnection cost. It will be helpful in several places to consider a
variation of the block graph,10 which we call the bridge tree. Its definition requires
some preparation. If W Ď V is maximal under the condition that the induced
subgraph G[W] is connected and does not contain any bridges of G[W], we call
W a bridgeless connected component, abbreviated “BCC”. The proof of the following
proposition is straightforward.
5.1 Proposition. A set of vertices W Ď V is a BCC if and only if W is maximal under the
condition that the induced subgraph G[W] is connected and does not contain any bridges
of G.
Proof. Let W be maximal under the condition of G[W] being connected and not
containing any bridges of G[W], i. e., we follow the original definition given above.
Clearly, G[W] does not contain any bridges of G, since if removal of some edge
disconnects G, then it also disconnects G[W] if the endpoints of this edge are in W.
We choose U Ě W maximal under the condition that G[U] is connected and G[U]
does not contain any bridges of G. Suppose U ‰W. Then G[U] contains a bridge
e of G[U]. Since this is no bridge of G, it is located on a cycle C. Then V(C) * U,
since e is a bridge of G[U]. But G[U YV(C)] would still be connected and would
contain no bridge of G. This contradicts the maximality of U.
Now let W be maximal under the condition of G[W] being connected and not
containing any bridges of G. If G[W] contained a bridge e of G[W] (but not of G),
we could use the cycle-argument from before to augment W and have a contradic-
tion to its maximality. Suppose there is U ) W such that G[U] is connected and
G[U] does not contain any bridges of G[U]. Then G[U] contains a bridge of G. As
noted earlier, this is also a bridge of G[U], a contradiction.
What we call “BCC” is sometimes called “block” in the literature, and what we
call “bridge tree” is then called “bridge-block tree”. We refrain from using “block”
here, since it usually is related to vertex-connectivity; see, e. g., [Die05, p. 55].
10See, e. g., [Die05, p. 56] for the definition of the block graph.
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(a) A graph G.
7
34
(b) The corresponding bridge tree G˜.
Figure 2. Bridge tree construction. Vertices representing BCCs of more than 1 vertices
have their number of vertices attached, here 4, 7, and 3, respectively.
Every vertex is contained in exactly one BCC. If W is a BCC, we have to
remove at least 2 edges from G[W] in order to make it disconnected. A graph from
which we have to remove at least 2 edges to make it disconnected is also called
being “2-edge-connected” in common terminology, provided that it has more than
1 vertices; see, e. g., [Die05, p. 12].
Now we introduce the bridge tree of a graph G = (V, E). It is the graph
G˜ = (V˜, E˜) defined by:
V˜ := {B Ď V; B is a BCC} ,
E˜ := {{B, B1} ; B, B1 P V˜ ^Dv P B,w P B1 : {v,w} P E} .
Then G˜ is a tree (assuming G is connected). By Proposition 5.1, if φ maps each
vertex of G to the BCC in which it is contained, then {v,w} ÞÑ {φ(v), φ(w)} maps
from the set of bridges of G to the set of edges of G˜ and is bijective. We make the
following special convention concerning the bridge tree:
Convention. Whenever we speak of the number of vertices in a subgraph T of the
bridge tree, we count |B| for each vertex B P V(T).
In other words, we count the vertices that would be there if we expanded T
back to its corresponding subgraph of G. Figure 2 shows an example. Since each
vertex of G is in exactly one BCC, counting in this way for V˜ yields the number of
vertices in G, i. e., n.
On several occasions, when considering the effect of building additional edges,
we treat vertices of the bridge tree as players. This is justified since edges inside
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BCCs have relevance 0. Hence for a strategy profile S and B, B1 P V˜ the effect in
disconnection cost of a new edge between a player from B and a player of B1 is
specific to the pair {B, B1} and not to the particular players.
For a path P in G, let P˜ be its contracted counterpart in G˜, i. e., we replace
in P each maximal sequence of vertices from the same BCC B P V˜ with B. Then
the length |P˜| of P˜ is the number of bridges in P. For each pair v,w P V denote
P(v,w) an arbitrary shortest path from v to w; and P(v) := {P(v,w); w P V}. The
bridge tree helps bounding the disconnection cost. We conclude this section with
a preparation for this. For each v P V and e P E we easily observe:
rel(e, v) =
{
0 if e is a non-bridge
|{P P P(v); e P E(P)}| if e is a bridge. (5.2)
We use this to prove the following lemma, which we will apply in Section 8 and
Section 10. The lemma relates relevance to path length, and so to diameter. This is
possible since it is the same to count for each edge the number of paths that cross
this edge (establishing the connection to relevance) as to count for each path the
number of its edges (establishing the connection to path length).
5.3 Lemma. For each v P V we have R(v) ď (n´ 1)diam(G˜).
Proof. Fix v P V. We have
R(v)
def
= ∑
ePE
rel(e, v)
(5.2)
= ∑
ePE
e is a bridge
|{P P P(v); e P E(P)}|
= ∑
PPP(v)
|{e P E(P); e is a bridge}| = ∑
PPP(v)
|P˜| ď (n´ 1)diam(G˜) .
The last estimation is true since the bridge tree is a tree and so every path is a
shortest path.
6 A Simple Bound on the Price of Anarchy
We give an upper bound on the price of anarchy for a general adversary. It holds
independently of the link formation rule and the equilibrium concept, provided
that equilibria have few edges.
6.1 Proposition. Let S be any strategy profile and (as usual) m = |E(S)|.
(i) If m = O(n), then C(S)OPT(n,α) = O(1+
n
α ).
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(ii) If m = O(n) and α = Ω(n), then C(S)OPT(n,α) = O(1).
Proof. Since sep(e) = O(n2) for all e, we have
C(S) = O (m α + n2 ∑
ePE
Pr({e})) = O(nα + n2) .
Since an optimum is connected, the optimal social cost is Ω(nα). Dividing by this
yields (i). Assertion (ii) follows from (i).
The following corollary is obvious.
6.2 Corollary. Fix any link formation rule and equilibrium concept.
(i) If the number of edges in each equilibrium is O(n), then the price of anarchy is
O(1+ nα ).
(ii) If the number of edges in each equilibrium is O(n) and moreover α = Ω(n), then
the price of anarchy is O(1).
A remark on the meaning of O and Ω is in order. Recall that we use this
notation to avoid having to introduce all occurring constants explicitly, and that a
constant is required to be independent of all game parameters, strategy profiles, etc.
For example, the constant hidden in the premise “m = O(n)” in Proposition 6.1(i)
is required to be independent of n, α, and S, while the constant hidden in the
conclusion “ C(S)OPT(n,α) = O(1+
n
α )” is guaranteed to have the same independence.
The proof reflects that this is true. In Corollary 6.2(i), it is required that there exists
a constant c ą 0 such that for each equilibrium S we have |E(S)| ď cn. Here as
well, c is required to be independent of n, α, and S.
The main goal of Section 8 and Section 9 is to show a bound of O(1) on the
price of anarchy for ULF and restricted to two special adversaries, which are cho-
sen to mark extreme cases. We will there proceed in showing the O(n) bound on
the number of edges in a NE first. In Section 8, we will then bound disconnection
cost of NE by O(nα). In Section 9, we achieve the same bound under the condi-
tion that α ă cn for a constant specified there. If α ě cn, then we are done by
Corollary 6.2(ii).
The O(1) bound would follow trivially if we could show an O(nα) bound for
the social cost of any strategy profile. However, later Proposition 8.1 shows that
there is no hope for this, and hence we will have to exploit characteristics of NE
in order to prove our bounds.
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7 Optima, Nash Equilibria, Price of Stability
We stick to ULF (and NE as equilibrium concept) in this and the following two
sections. The aim of this section is to construct optima and NE, and finally to show
how a bound on the price of stability follows easily. The adversaries considered
are a general one, i. e., without any additional assumptions, and one inducing
anonymous disconnection cost. Although we do everything for ULF and NE here,
most of the results can be carried over to BLF and PNE or PS, as will be discussed
in Section 10.
7.1 Proposition. An optimum has social cost Θ(nα). More precisely:
(i) If α ď 2 (n´ 1), the cycle is an optimum; it has social cost nα.
(ii) If α ě 2 (n´ 1), a star is an optimum; it has social cost (n´ 1) (α + 2).
Proof. An optimum can only be the cycle or a tree, because any graph containing
a cycle has already the building cost nα of the cycle, and the cycle has optimal
disconnection cost. So an optimum is either the cycle, or it is cycle-free. Let T be
any tree. We have its indirect cost:
∑
ePE(T)
sep(e)Pr({e}) = 2 ∑
ePE(T)
ν(e) (n´ ν(e))Pr({e})
ě 2 ¨ 1 (n´ 1) ∑
ePE(T)
Pr({e}) = 2 (n´ 1) .
Hence the social cost of a tree is at least
(n´ 1) α + 2 (n´ 1) = (n´ 1) (α + 2) .
The social cost of the cycle is nα. So if α ď 2 (n´ 1), the cycle is better or as good
as any tree, hence it is an optimum. If α ą 2 (n´ 1), then we look for a good tree.
A star has social cost (n´ 1) (α + 2), which matches the lower bound given above,
and is hence optimal (and better than the cycle). However, for α = 2 (n´ 1), both
cycle and star are optimal with social cost 2n (n´ 1).
The following simple remark later will help establishing concrete bounds on
the price of anarchy.
7.2 Remark. Assume there are constants c0, c1 ą 0 such that the social cost of all
equilibria is bounded by (c1n + c0) α. Then the price of anarchy is bounded by
c1 +
c1+c0
n´1 .
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Proof. If the optimum is nα, we have the ratio (c1n+c0) αnα = c1 +
c0
n ď c1 +
c1+c0
n´1 . Oth-
erwise, if the optimum is (n´ 1) (α + 2), we have the ratio (c1n+c0) α
(n´1) (α+2) ă
c1n+c0
n´1 =
c1 (n´1)+c1+c0
n´1 = c1 +
c1+c0
n´1 .
The following two propositions can be proved by appropriate cost-benefit anal-
ysis.
7.3 Proposition. Let S be a star with edges pointing outward.
(i) If α ě n´ 1, then S is a NE.
(ii) If α ě 2´ 1n´1 , then S is a NE if disconnection cost is anonymous.
In both cases, strict inequality implies a MaxNE.
Proof. (i) Since all edges point outward, the center player is the only one that could
sell edges, but this would make the graph disconnected. Exchanges of edges by the
center cannot lead to a different strategy profile. The maximum disconnection cost
is experienced by a leaf vertex when the probability measure is concentrated on
the one edge that connects it to the rest. The disconnection cost is then n´ 1. Since
this is at most α, there is no incentive to buy additional edges. Hence no player can
strictly improve her individual cost by changing her strategy. (If multiple edges
between the same players were allowed, the center could build additional edges.
However, since α ą 1, this would increase her cost.)
(ii) Disconnection cost of the center is 1. By anonymity, all leafs experience the
same disconnection cost. It follows easily from this that all edges have the same
probability, namely 1n´1 . Disconnection cost of a leaf hence is
(n´ 1) + (n´ 2)
n´ 1
=
(n´ 1) + (n´ 1)´ 1
n´ 1
= 2´
1
n´ 1
.
Now we apply the same arguments as for part (i). Maximality is clear in both
cases by Remark 2.3.
7.4 Proposition. Let S be a cycle with all edges pointing in the same direction (either all
clockwise or all counter-clockwise).
(i) If α ď 1, then S is a MaxNE.
(ii) If α ď 12⌊ n´12 ⌋, then S is a MaxNE if disconnection cost is anonymous.
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Proof. Maximality in both cases is due to the cycle having minimum disconnection
cost, namely 0. Buying or exchanging edges is also not beneficial since the cycle
already has minimum disconnection cost. We only have to check whether it is
beneficial for a player v to sell her one edge. Selling the edge yields a path with
v at one of its ends. This increases disconnection cost for v to at least 1, since the
removal of any edge disconnects v from at least one other vertex. This proves (i).
To prove (ii), we have to establish a better lower bound on the new disconnec-
tion cost for v. Anonymity of indirect cost allows us to do so. Let the path be
(v1, e1, v2, . . . , en´1, vn) with v = v1. We claim that
Pr({ei}) = Pr({en´i}) for all i P {1, . . . , n´ 1} , (7.5)
i. e., the adversary behaves like a symmetric one on this graph. From (7.5) it
follows ∑
⌈(n´1)/2⌉
i=1 Pr({ei}) ě 12 . Since each of the edges e1, . . . , e⌈(n´1)/2⌉ has relevance
at least ⌊(n´1)/2⌋ for v, the proposition follows.
We are left with proving (7.5). For each i P [n] we write Ii for the indirect cost
of vertex vi, and moreover define its left indirect cost by I
left
i := ∑
i´1
j=1 j Pr({ej}) and
its right indirect cost by Irighti := ∑
n´i
j=1 j Pr({en´j}). Then clearly Ii = Ilefti + Irighti . It
suffices to show (7.5) for i ă n2 . We have (in fact even for i ď n´ 1) on the one
hand:
Ii = I
left
i + (n´ i)Pr({ei}) + Irighti+1
= I
left
i + (n´ i)Pr({ei}) + Ii+1´ Ilefti+1
= I
left
i + (n´ i)Pr({ei}) + Ii+1´
(
I
left
i + i Pr({ei})
)
= (n´ 2i)Pr({ei}) + Ii+1 .
On the other hand, along the same lines we prove In´i+1 = (n´ 2i)Pr({en´i}) +
In´i. By anonymity, Ii = In´i+1 and Ii+1 = In´i. It follows (n ´ 2i)Pr({ei}) =
(n´ 2i)Pr({en´i}), and since i ă n2 , this means Pr({ei}) = Pr({en´i}).
For anonymous disconnection cost, this proves existence of NE for all ranges
of α provided that n ě 9, since then 2´ 1n´1 ď 2 ď
1
2⌊ n´12 ⌋. In the range 2´ 1n´1 ď
α ď 12⌊ n´12 ⌋ two very different topologies – namely cycle and star – co-exist as NE.
Convention. All our statements on upper bounds on the price of anarchy are
restricted to those combinations of n and α for which equilibria exist for the re-
spective adversary. Instead of this convention, we could rely on the maximum
over the empty set being defined to ´8. Hence any alleged upper bound on the
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price of anarchy would be true in case that no equilibria exist.
The following is a consequence of Proposition 7.1, Proposition 7.3, and
Proposition 7.4.
7.6 Theorem. For anonymous disconnection cost and n ě 9 the price of stability is
bounded by 1+ 8n´2 = 1+ o(1).
Proof. For α ď 12⌊ n´12 ⌋ the cycle is a NE as well as an optimum, and so the price
of stability is 1. For α ě 2 (n´ 1) a star is a NE as well as an optimum, and so the
price of stability is 1.
For 12⌊ n´12 ⌋ ď α ď 2 (n´ 1), the star is a NE (since 2 ď α by n ě 9, so 2´ 1n´1 ă
2 ď α) and the cycle is an optimum. The price of stability so is upper-bounded by
(n´ 1) (α + 2)
nα
ď 1+
2
α
ď 1+
4
⌊ n´12 ⌋
ď 1+
8
n´ 2
.
8 Simple-Minded Adversary
The simple-minded adversary picks an edge uniformly at random, that is, Pr({e}) =
1
m for all e P E. Then we have individual and social cost:
Cv(S) = |Sv| α +
1
m ∑ePE
rel(e, v) = |Sv| α +
1
m
R(v) for v P V,
C(S) = m α +
1
m ∑vPV
R(v) .
Clearly, this is a symmetric adversary and hence disconnection cost is anonymous.
All results in this section are for the simple-minded adversary. As promised earlier,
we give an example for a non-linear (in n) social cost.
8.1 Proposition. Social cost of a path is (n´ 1) α + 13n (n+ 1) = Θ(nα + n
2).
Proof. We have the social cost of a path:
m α +
1
m ∑vPV
∑
ePE
rel(e, v) = (n´ 1) α +
1
n´ 1 ∑ePE
∑
vPV
rel(e, v)
= (n´ 1) α +
1
n´ 1 ∑
ePE
sep(e)
= (n´ 1) α +
1
n´ 1 ∑ePE
2 ν(e) (n ´ ν(e))
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= (n´ 1) α +
2
n´ 1
n´1
∑
k=1
k (n´ k)
= (n´ 1) α +
2
n´ 1
(
n
(n´ 1) n
2
´
(n´ 1) n (2n´ 1)
6
)
= (n´ 1) α +
1
3
n (n+ 1) = Θ(nα + n2) .
Bounding Cost Changes and Cycle Length
We estimate the benefit for a player of building or selling a particular edge. This
will become useful in several places. It moreover immediately leads to a structural
result on the length of cycles. The following remark is purely graph-theoretic and
will be used here and later, in Section 10, when we study convexity of cost.
8.2 Remark. Let G = (V, E) be a graph.
(i) Let e = {v,w} R E and C be any cycle in G + e with e P E(C). Then all
bridges in G that are non-bridges in G+ e are located on C.
(ii) Let e = {v,w} P E be a non-bridge and C be any cycle with e P E(C). Then
all bridges of G´ e that are non-bridges in G, are in E(C).
Proof. (i) The additional edge e creates exactly one cycle C˜ in the bridge tree. All
bridges in G that are non-bridges in G+ e correspond to edges on C˜, and all those
in turn correspond to edges on C.
(ii) Let f be a non-bridge in G and a bridge in G´ e. Then G´ e consists of two
subgraphs G1 and G2 that are connected only by f . Since f was no bridge before e
was removed, e must also connect G1 with G2. Moreover, there are no other edges
between G1 and G2. It follows that any cycle that contains e also contains f .
8.3 Proposition. For each player v we have R(v) ď n (n´1)2 .
Proof. We repeat the counting argument from the proof of Lemma 5.3:
R(v)
def
= ∑
ePE
rel(e, v)
(5.2)
= ∑
ePE
e is a bridge
|{P P P(v); e P E(P)}|
= ∑
PPP(v)
|{e P E(P); e is a bridge}| ď ∑
PPP(v)
|E(P)| = ∑
wPV
dist(v,w) .
This is maximal if G is a path with v at its end; then R(v) = n (n´1)2 .
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Fix a player v. Let R := R(v) and let R1 be the same quantity when an addi-
tional edge e is built by v. By the previous proposition, we have R, R1 ď n (n´1)2 .
The benefit in disconnection cost of building this edge for player v is 1mR´
1
m+1R
1.
Due to the change in denominators from “m” to “m + 1” this expression looks
somewhat unhandy. Yet, we can give good bounds incorporating the change in
relevances, ∆R := R´ R1 ě 0, with one denominator. We can do something similar
for the case when the player sells an edge, where we put ∆R := R1 ´ R ě 0.
8.4 Proposition.
(i) If a player builds an additional edge and the sum of her relevances drops from R to
R1 by ∆R := R´ R1, then her improvement in disconnection cost is at least 1m+1∆R
and at most 12 +
1
m+1∆R ď
n
2 .
(ii) If a player sells a non-bridge and the sum of her relevances increases from R to R1
by ∆R := R1 ´ R, then her impairment in disconnection cost is at least 1m∆R and
at most 12 +
1
m∆R ď
n
2 .
Proof. (i) We have
1
m
R´
1
m+ 1
R1 =
1
m
R´
1
m+ 1
(R+ (R1´ R)) =
( 1
m
´
1
m+ 1
)
R+
1
m+ 1
∆R
=
1
m (m+ 1)
R+
1
m+ 1
∆R
{
ď 12 +
1
m+1∆R ď
n
2
ě 1m+1∆R
.
We used ∆R ď n (n´1)2 and n ´ 1 ď m for the upper bound. (ii) is proved alike,
using n ď m since the graph contains a cycle.
8.5 Proposition.
(i) If a player builds an edge creating a cycle of length ℓ, the improvement in discon-
nection cost is at most 12 +
1
m+1 (ℓ´ 1) (n ´
ℓ
2). (The graph is allowed to already
contain other cycles.)
(ii) If a player sells an edge destroying a cycle of length ℓ, the impairment in disconnec-
tion cost is at most 12 +
1
m (ℓ´ 1) (n´
ℓ
2).
Proof. (i) Let C = (v, e1, v1, . . . , vℓ´1, eℓ, v) be any new cycle, created by the new
edge eℓ bought by v. By Remark 8.2(i), all edges for which a change in relevance
occurs by adding eℓ, i. e., all edges that were bridges and become non-bridges due
to the new edge, are located on this cycle. In the best case, i. e., in case of maximal
improvement,
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• all ℓ edges were bridges before and became non-bridges now, and
• without the additional edge, n´ 1 vertices are reached from v only through e1,
n´ 2 through the next edge, and so on; edge eℓ´1 is relevant for (n ´ (ℓ ´ 1))
vertices.
It follows
∆R ď
ℓ´1
∑
k=1
(n´ k) = (ℓ´ 1) n´
ℓ´1
∑
k=1
k = (ℓ´ 1) n´
(ℓ´ 1) ℓ
2
= (ℓ´ 1) (n´
ℓ
2
) .
The statement follows with Proposition 8.4(i).
(ii) By Remark 8.2(ii), we may consider any cycle that is destroyed. The rest is
the same calculation as for (i).
8.6 Proposition. Let ℓ ă α + 12 .
(i) If a player builds an edge creating a cycle of length ℓ, she suffers an impairment in
her cost.
(ii) If a player sells an edge destroying a cycle of length ℓ, she experiences an improve-
ment in her cost.
Proof. (i) By Proposition 8.5(i), the player suffers an impairment in her cost if
α ą
1
2
+
1
m+ 1
(ℓ´ 1)
(
n´
ℓ
2
)
.
Since m ě n´ 1, this is the case if α ą 12 +
1
n (ℓ´ 1) (n´
ℓ
2), which is the same as
n (α + 12) ą ℓ (n´
ℓ
2 +
1
2). Since ℓ ě 3 ě 1, this is the case if n (α +
1
2) ą ℓn.
We show (ii) in almost exactly the same way, using Proposition 8.5(ii) and that
m ě n, since the original graph contains a cycle.
It follows the structural result:
8.7 Corollary. No NE contains cycles shorter than α + 12 .
Bounding the Price of Anarchy
The following observation is the key to showing that a NE does not have many
more edges than a tree.
8.8 Proposition. A NE is chord-free.
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Proof. Selling a chord e = {v,w} from a cycle C = (v, . . . ,w, . . . , v) does not in-
crease the relevance of any edge for any player. To see this, we show that the
bridge tree does not change by removal of e. Assume for contradiction that there
exists an edge e1 which is a bridge in G1 := G ´ e, but which is no bridge in G.
Then G1 ´ e1 consists of two components G1 and G2. Since e1 is no bridge in G, the
edge e connects G1 and G2. But then, due to the existence of C, in addition to e
there are two more edges between G1 and G2. Hence removal of the single edge e1
from G1 cannot disconnect G1 from G2.
If the graph is bridgeless, removing a chord would thus decrease the player’s
building cost without increasing the disconnection cost. Now let the graph contain
a bridge e1. Due to the decrease in the denominator of the disconnection cost,
removing a chord impairs the disconnection cost. However, the player owning the
chord, say v, would rather remove the chord and instead build an edge to form
a new cycle containing e1. The only case where this is impossible is when v is
one endpoint of the bridge e1 = {v, u}, and u is a leaf vertex. Then, a double-
edge between v and u would be needed, which is not allowed unless we use a
multigraph.
We consider this case now and show that we in fact do not need a multigraph.
By selling the chord, the disconnection cost for v increases by 1
m (m´1)R(v). If this
increase is strictly smaller than α, we are done. Hence assume 1
m (m´1)R(v) ě α
now. Edge {v, u} has relevance n´ 1 for u. Due to the positions of v and u, we
have R(u) = R(v) + (n´ 1) ´ 1. If u builds an edge to any other vertex, save v,
edge e1 is put on a cycle. The improvement in disconnection cost for u by building
such an edge is at least
1
m
R(u)´
1
m+ 1
(R(u)´ (n´ 1)) =
1
m
(R(v) + n´ 2)´
1
m+ 1
(R(v)´ 1)
=
( 1
m
´
1
m+ 1
)
R(v) +
n´ 2
m
+
1
m+ 1
=
1
m (m+ 1)
R(v) +
n´ 2
m
+
1
m+ 1
=
( 1
m (m´ 1)
+
1
m (m+ 1)
´
1
m (m´ 1)
)
R(v) +
n´ 2
m
+
1
m+ 1
ě α´
1
m
( 1
m´ 1
´
1
m+ 1
)
R(v) +
n´ 2
m
+
1
m+ 1
ě α´
1
m
( 1
m´ 1
´
1
m+ 1
) n (n´ 1)
2
+
n´ 2
m
+
1
m+ 1
ě α´
( 1
m´ 1
´
1
m+ 1
) n´ 1
2
+
n´ 2
m
+
1
m+ 1
= α´
2
(m´ 1) (m+ 1)
n´ 1
2
+
n´ 2
m
+
1
m+ 1
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ě α´
1
m+ 1
+
n´ 2
m
+
1
m+ 1
ą α .
So u has an incentive to buy an additional edge, a contradiction to NE.
The next two are graph-theoretic results. The first is a straightforward adap-
tion of a result (and its proof) on vertex-connectivity to edge-connectivity; see,
e. g., [Die05, Prop. 3.1.3] for the version for vertex-connectivity.
8.9 Proposition. Any bridgeless connected graph can be constructed from a cycle by
successively adding paths or cycles of the form (u, e1, v1, . . . , vk, ek+1,w), where u,w are
vertices of the already constructed graph (u = w is allowed) and v1, . . . , vk are zero or
more new vertices.
Proof. Clearly, any graph that was constructed in this manner is connected and
bridgeless. Now let G be connected and bridgeless and H a subgraph of G that is
constructible in this manner, chosen such that it has a maximum number of edges
among all such subgraphs. Since G contains a cycle, H is not empty. Also, H is an
induced subgraph since H + e is also constructible for any edge e. If H ‰ G, then
since G is connected, there is an edge e = {v,w} with v R V(H) and w P V(H).
Since G is bridgeless, this edge is on a cycle C = (w, e, v = v1, . . . , vk = w). Let vi
be the first vertex with vi P V(H). Then P := (w, . . . , vi) is a path or cycle of the
form used in the construction, and so H + P is constructible and has more edges
than H, a contradiction.
8.10 Proposition. A chord-free graph on n vertices contains no more than 2n´ 1 = O(n)
edges.
Proof. Let G be a chord-free graph, w.l.o.g. being connected. We first consider the
case that G is bridgeless. By the previous proposition, G can be constructed from
a cycle on, say, N0 vertices, by successively adding paths of the form (u, e1, v1, . . . ,
vk, ek+1,w), where u,w are vertices of the already constructed graph and v1, . . . , vk,
k P N0, are zero or more new vertices. For any two vertices u,w in the already
constructed graph, there is a cycle C with u,w P V(C). Since G is chord-free,
we may not add a path (u, e1,w). Hence k ě 1 in each step, i. e., at least one
new vertex is added. It follows that there are at most t ď n´ N0 =: N1 ď n ´ 1
steps in this construction. Let ni and mi be the number of new vertices and edges,
respectively, inserted in step i. Then mi = ni + 1 for each i P [t] and so we add
∑
t
i=1mi = ∑
t
i=1(ni + 1) = N1 + t ď 2N1 edges to the initial cycle. It follows that G
has at most N0 + 2N1 = n+ N1 ď 2n´ 1 edges.
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If G is not bridgeless, we consider its BCCs B1, . . . , Br; these correspond to the
vertices of the bridge tree, and r = |V˜| is the number of vertices of the bridge tree.
By what we proved above, the BCCs contribute at most ∑ri=1(2|Bi|´ 1) = 2n´ r
edges. In addition, since the bridge tree is a tree, there are at most r ´ 1 edges
(these are all the bridges of G, or in other words all the edges of the bridge tree).
So we have a total bound of 2n´ r+ (r´ 1) = 2n´ 1.
8.11 Corollary. A NE has at most 2n´ 1 = O(n) edges.
Proof. Follows from Proposition 8.8 and Proposition 8.10.
Now we know that the total building cost in a NE is O(nα), hence it is of the
same order as the optimal social cost. In order to bound the price of anarchy, we
are left with bounding the disconnection cost. To this end, we make use of the
bridge tree. The following is a corollary to Lemma 5.3.
8.12 Corollary. The disconnection cost is bounded by ndiam(G˜).
Proof. We have by Lemma 5.3:
1
m ∑vPV
∑
ePE
rel(e, v) =
1
m ∑vPV
R(v) ď
1
m ∑vPV
(n´ 1)diam(G˜)
=
n
m
(n´ 1)diam(G˜) ď ndiam(G˜) .
A bound on the diameter of the bridge tree holding for all NE will hence yield
a bound on the price of anarchy. This is accomplished by the following lemma.
8.13 Lemma. The bridge tree of a NE has its diameter bounded by 8α = O(α).
Proof. Let G be a NE. Let P˜ = (v0, e1, v1, . . . , eℓ, vℓ) be a path in the bridge tree
G˜ connecting two leaves v0 and vℓ. Let ℓ¯ := ⌈ ℓ2⌉ ě 1. Then at least one of the
following is true (recall the convention on page 21 regarding vertex-counting in
the bridge tree):
• At least ⌈ n2 ⌉ vertices lie beyond eℓ¯ from the view of v0.
• At least ⌈ n2 ⌉ vertices lie beyond eℓ¯ from the view of vℓ.
Let us assume the first; the other case can be treated alike. Let v := v0 and
w := vℓ and recall that we may treat vertices of the bridge tree G˜ as single players
with respect to building of new links. Then e1, . . . , eℓ¯ for v have relevance at least
⌈ n2 ⌉ each. So ∑ℓ¯i=1 rel(ei, v) ě ℓ¯ n2 ě ℓ2 n2 = Ω(ℓn). By building {v,w}, player v
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would have a benefit in disconnection cost of at least 1m+1
ℓn
4 ě
1
2n
ℓn
4 = Ω(ℓ), using
the bound m ď 2n´ 1 from Corollary 8.11. Since the edge is not built, α is larger
than this benefit, so ℓ ď 8α = O(α).
8.14 Corollary. The disconnection cost in a NE is bounded by 8nα = O(nα).
Proof. Follows from Corollary 8.12 and Lemma 8.13.
8.15 Theorem. The price of anarchy with a simple-minded adversary is bounded by O(1).
Proof. The building cost and the disconnection cost in a NE are both O(nα) by
Corollary 8.11 and Corollary 8.14. The theorem follows with Proposition 7.1, which
states that the optimum social cost is Θ(nα).
A closer look at Lemma 8.13 and its proof reveals that there exists a constant
c ą 0 such that if m = O(n) then there are players who can improve their discon-
nection cost by c through the building of new links, as long as the graph contains
bridges. It follows that for α ă c, all NE are bridgeless, i. e., they have disconnec-
tion cost 0 and the adversary cannot harm them. This does not rule out, however,
that they may contain an unnecessarily high number of links, compared to an op-
timum. On the other hand, the ratio cannot be more than O(1) by Theorem 8.15.
8.16 Remark. The constant in Theorem 8.15 is bounded by 10+ 10n´1 = 10+ o(1).
Proof. Building cost of a NE is bounded by 2nα by Corollary 8.11. Disconnection
cost of a NE is bounded by 8nα by Corollary 8.14. In total, social cost of a NE
is bounded by 10nα. Using Remark 7.2 with c1 := 10 and c0 := 0 proves the
claim.
9 Smart Adversary
We remain with ULF and consider an adversary that destroys an edge which sep-
arates a maximum number of vertex pairs. If there are several such edges, one
of them is chosen uniformly at random. In other words, we replace the uni-
form probability distribution on the edges for one that is concentrated on the
edges which cause maximum overall damage. Recall that sep(e) is the number
of separated vertex pairs when edge e is deleted. Let sepmax := maxePE sep(e)
and Emax := {e P E; sep(e) = sepmax} and mmax := |Emax|. These are the edges of
which each causes a maximum number of separated vertex pairs when it is deleted.
34
9. Smart Adversary
We call them the critical edges. The adversary chooses one of those uniformly at
random. Clearly, this yields a symmetric adversary, and so disconnection cost is
anonymous. We have the individual and social cost:
Cv(S) = |Sv| α +
1
mmax
∑
ePEmax
rel(e, v) for v P V,
C(S) = m α +
1
mmax
∑
ePEmax
sepmax = m α + sepmax .
If sepmax = 0, then the graph is bridgeless and all edges are critical – however,
their removal does not separate any vertex pairs. If sepmax ą 0, then there are one
or more critical edges, and each of them is a bridge. Recall that if e is a bridge, ν(e)
denotes the number of vertices in the smaller component of G´ e, or n2 if both are
of equal size. If e is no bridge, then ν(e) = 0. We have sep(e) = 2ν(e) (n´ ν(e)) for
all edges. The function x ÞÑ 2x (n´ x) is strictly increasing on [0, n2 ], so ν(e) = ν(e
1)
follows from sep(e) = sep(e1). Hence ν(e) = ν(e1) for all critical edges e, e1 P Emax.
9.1 Proposition. If sepmax ą 0 and if there are more than one critical edges, they form a
subgraph that is a star in the bridge tree G˜.
Proof. Let sepmax ą 0. For any two distinct bridges e and e
1, one component of
G ´ e is strictly contained in one component of G ´ e1. Therefore, with multiple
critical edges, ν(e) ă n2 for all e P Emax, and so also for all other bridges (since
they have smaller ν(¨) value). In other words, there is always a small and a large
component of G´ e, with e being a bridge.
Let P = (v0, e1, v1, . . . , vℓ´1, eℓ, vℓ) be a path in the bridge tree G˜ with e1 and
eℓ being distinct critical edges. First assume that vℓ is in the larger component of
G´ eℓ. Then v0 is in the smaller component of G´ e1. Then the smaller component
of G ´ e2 cannot contain v0, since otherwise ν(e1) ă ν(e2), and e1 would not be
critical. So the component of G´ e2 containing v0 is the larger one, and then the
same holds for the component of G ´ eℓ containing v0. This contradicts that vℓ
is in the larger component of G ´ eℓ. We can carry out the same argument with
v0 and e1. Summarizing, now we know that the smaller component of G ´ e1 is
located ‘before’ P and that the smaller component of G´ eℓ is located ‘beyond’ P.
If ℓ ě 3, then there is an edge f between e1 and eℓ on P. The smaller component
of G´ f strictly contains either the smaller component of G ´ e1 or G´ eℓ. Since
ν(e1) = ν(e2), we have thus in particular, ν( f ) ą ν(e1), a contradiction that e1 is
critical. Hence there is no such edge f , and so ℓ = 2. Since this holds for all
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(a) A path with all edges pointing to the nearest end.
(b) Center vertex cannot improve by exchanging her edges.
Figure 3. NE if α ě n2 . Critical edges are drawn dashed. Disconnection cost for the center
vertex is ⌊ n2 ⌋ in both cases, which is 4 here.
pairs (e1, eℓ) of critical edges, the set of all critical edges forms a star (in the bridge
tree).
The smart adversary admits a new NE topology:
9.2 Proposition. If α ě n2 , then a path with all edges pointing to the nearest end (in
case of even n, the middle edge having arbitrary orientation) is a NE with social cost
Θ(nα + n2). If α ą n2 , it is a MaxNE.
Proof. The social cost of the path is (n´ 1) α + ⌊ n2 ⌋⌈ n2 ⌉ = Θ(nα + n2). The adver-
sary removes the one or two – depending on whether n is even or odd – middle
edges. The disconnection cost for each player is n2 ď α if n is even and at most
1
2 (⌊ n2 ⌋ + ⌈ n2 ⌉) = n2 ď α if n is odd. Hence, there is no incentive for any player
to build more edges than she currently owns, even after exchanging the currently
built edges for others.
Now consider that a player v sells one (or two) of her edges and buys one (or
two) different ones instead. First consider that one edge is exchanged. Since all
edges point outward, the part of the path that becomes disconnected from v does
not contain the critical edge(s). So, after reconnecting it with v via a new edge,
there are as many vertices on both sides of the formerly critical edge(s) as before
the exchange. No separation value increases. Hence the formerly critical edges
remain critical. They also maintain their relevance for v. With the same argument,
if the exchanged edge itself was critical, the new one will be critical as well, also
with the same relevance for v.
When two edges are exchanged, v is the center vertex, and in particular all
critical edge(s) are among the exchanged ones, see Figure 3. This again means
that the disconnected parts do not contain critical edges, and so the exchange
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cannot change that each of the two edges has ⌊ n2 ⌋ vertices on the one and ⌈ n2 ⌉
vertices on the other side, so they remain critical. Also, their relevance for v does
not change. The MaxNE property is clear by Remark 2.3.
Bounding the Price of Anarchy
The proof of the following is even easier than previously:
9.3 Remark. A NE is chord-free.
Proof. Removing a chord does not change the relevance of any edge, nor does
it change sepmax, hence it does not change Emax. Selling a chord so is always
beneficial.
With Proposition 8.10, it follows immediately:
9.4 Corollary. A NE has at most 2n´ 1 = O(n) edges.
We are again left with bounding the disconnection cost of NE. This requires
some effort and is accomplished in the following remark and two lemmas.
9.5 Remark. If there are k ě 2 critical edges, say Emax = {e1, . . . , ek}, and e1 is put
on a cycle by an additional edge, but not e2, . . . , ek, then the new critical edges
are e2, . . . , ek. If k ě 3 and the additional edge puts e1 and e2 on a cycle, but not
e3, . . . , ek, then the new critical edges are e3, . . . , ek.
Proof. An additional edge e only changes the ν(¨) value of those edges which are
put on a cycle by e, namely it reduces them to 0. Hence, none of the edges in
{e2, . . . , ek} (or {e3, . . . , ek}) becomes less attractive for the adversary when e is
added. Also no other edge becomes more attractive by the addition of e, since no
ν(¨) value increases.
9.6 Lemma. Let α ď cn for a constant c ą 0 and fix a NE with mmax ě 3. Then we have
sepmax ď 2 (1+ 9c) nα = O(nα).
Proof. Fix two critical edges e1 and e2, and set n0 := ν(e1). For each i P {1, 2}
fix a player vi in the smaller component of G ´ ei. Then for each i P {1, 2} we
have rel(ei, vi) = n´ n0 and rel(e, vi) = n0 for all critical edges e ‰ ei; recall that
all critical edges have the same ν(¨) value. Building {v1, v2} puts e1 and e2 on a
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cycle and leaves the other mmax ´ 2 critical edges critical by Remark 9.5. For each
i P {1, 2},11 player vi has her disconnection cost decreased by:
1
mmax
∑
ePEmax
rel(e, vi)´
1
mmax ´ 2
∑
ePEmax
eR{e1,e2}
rel(e, vi)
=
1
mmax
((mmax ´ 1) n0 + n´ n0)´
1
mmax ´ 2
(mmax ´ 2) n0
=
1
mmax
((mmax ´ 2) n0 + n)´ n0 =
1
mmax
(n´ 2n0) .
Since we are in a NE, this is at most α. Since n ě mmaxn0, we have n ´ 2n0 ě
(mmax ´ 2) n0, and so it follows α ě (1 ´ 2mmax ) n0 ě
1
3n0. Moreover, it follows
mmaxα + n0 ě n´ n0. With these two inequalities at hand, we can bound sepmax.
We have
sepmax = 2n0 (n´ n0) ď 2n0 (mmaxα + n0) ď 2 (n0mmaxα + 9α
2)
ď 2 (nα + 9α2)
αďcn
ď 2 (nα + 9cnα) = 2 (1+ 9c) nα .
9.7 Lemma. Fix a NE with mmax P {1, 2}. Then
• we have sepmax ď 4nα = O(nα)
• or we have α ě 16n = Ω(n).
Proof. First we consider the case mmax = 2. A player can make the two critical
edges part of a cycle by building an additional edge. The difficulty lies in that
new critical edges, with a smaller separation value, can emerge. We will have to
put some more effort into estimating the improvement in disconnection cost that a
player is able to achieve by building another edge. Consider the bridge tree. There
are two subtrees T1 and T2 that are connected to the rest by the two critical edges
e1 and e2, respectively. They both have n0 := ν(e1) = ν(e2) vertices. There may be
more subtrees T3, . . . , TN connected by e3, . . . , eN to the center vertex. To streamline
notation, we often write Tk instead of V(Tk), k P [N], when we refer to the set of
vertices of a tree. Figure 4 on the next page depicts the situation. Figure 5 shows
how a new edge would put e1 and e2 on a cycle.
First assume that we can arrange v1 P T1 and v2 P T2 such that after building
{v1, v2}, there are no critical edges in T1 nor in T2. If there are no subtrees except
11It would suffice to restrict to i = 1 or i = 2. However, here and in the proof of the following
Lemma 9.7, we point out all arguments that are symmetric in the sense that both endpoints would
like to build the edge. This is interesting for BLF discussed in Section 10.
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T1
T3 TN
T2
u1u2
u3 uN
eN
e1e2
e3
Figure 4. Schematic view
of the bridge tree with two
critical edges e1 and e2,
drawn dashed. Subtrees
are represented by trian-
gles.
T1
T3 TN
T2
u1u2
u3 uN
eN
e1e2
e3
v1v2
Figure 5. How e1 and e2
are put on a cycle by a new
edge {v1, v2}. Paths that
are part of the new cycle
and located inside T1 and
T2 are depicted as zig-zag
paths. New critical edges
can emerge, e. g., e3 can be-
come critical.
T1 and T2, i. e., if N = 2, this means that we can make the graph bridgeless by
the additional edge. The improvement in disconnection cost for v1 (and also for
v2) of building {v1, v2} is hence their original disconnection cost, i. e., 12 (n´ n0 +
n0) =
1
2n ě
1
6n. If N ě 3, then critical edges emerge in one or more of the T3 +
e3, . . . , TN + eN after building. Fix k P {3, . . . ,N}. Since ek is not critical without
the new edge, we have |Tk| ă n0 or |Tk| ě ⌈ n2 ⌉. The latter can be excluded, since it
would imply that the smaller (or equally sized) component of G ´ ek includes T1
and the center vertex, and so ν(ek) ą n0 = ν(e1), in which case e1 would not be
critical. Moreover, we have |Tk| ď n´ 2n0 ă n´ 2 |Tk|, so |Tk| ă 13n. For a player in
T1 (or T2), a critical edge in Tk + ek can have relevance at most |Tk| and so no more
than 13n. The improvement in disconnection cost for v1 (and also for v2) gained
by building {v1, v2} is hence at least the original disconnection cost minus 13n, i. e.,
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ui
vi
Figure 6. Detailed view of Ti for one
i P {1, 2}. Path Pi is highlighted. Re-
call that vertices of the bridge tree are
counted according to the size of the re-
spective BCCs. Here, in this example,
we assume that each vertex counts 1.
The path is drawn accordingly, i. e., al-
ways descending into a subtree with a
maximum number of vertices.
1
2 (n´ n0 + n0)´
1
3n =
(
1
2 ´
1
3
)
n = 16n.
Now consider that for all choices of v1 P T1 and v2 P T2, building {v1, v2}
induces a critical edge in at least one of T1 or T2. For each i P {1, 2} we can
do the following. Let ui be the vertex where Ti is connected to the rest of the
graph and consider Ti being rooted at ui. Let Pi be a path starting at ui and
ending at one of the leaves of Ti, say wi, such that the path always descends into
a subtree that has a maximum number of vertices, as shown in Figure 6. If we
choose vi := wi, i = 1, 2, then each Pi does not contain a critical edge when we
build {v1, v2}, since these paths then both are located on a cycle. However, by
assumption, there is a critical edge f in, say T1. By construction of P1, we have
ν( f ) ď n02 . So, player v1 (and also v2) can reduce her disconnection cost to no
more than n02 . It follows that the improvement in disconnection cost is at least
1
2 (n ´ n0 + n0) ´
1
2n0 =
1
2 (n ´ n0), which is at most α, since we are in a NE. It
follows sepmax = 2n0 (n´ n0) ď 2n0 ¨ 2α ď 4nα.
The case of mmax = 1 can be treated similarly. Let e1 be the critical edge and T1
the subtree with n0 := ν(e1) vertices. There are zero or more additional subtrees,
say T2, . . . , TN . If there are zero such trees, define T2 := G˜´ T1, which consists of
just one vertex in the bridge tree then (but can consist of multiple vertices in G).
Let the ordering be such that |T2| ě |Tk| for all k P {3, . . . ,N}. Then we argue
similar to before with T1 and T2 in the roles of the former subtrees of the same
name. Assume first that we can find v1 P T1 and v2 P T2 such that building {v1, v2}
does not induce any critical edges in T1 nor T2. If N ď 2, then we can make the
graph bridgeless and this means an improvement for v1 of at least n´ n0, and so
sepmax = 2n0 (n´ n0) ď 2n0 α ď 4nα. If N ě 3, then fix k P {3, . . . ,N}. We have
|Tk| ă n0. Moreover, we have |Tk| ď n´ (|T2|+ n0) ď n´ 2 |Tk|, and so |Tk| ď 13n.
Then building {v1, v2} reduces the disconnection cost of v1 to no more than 13n.
This means an improvement for v1 of at least n´ n0 ´ 13n ě
2
3n´
1
2n =
1
6n.
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If each choice of v1 and v2 induces a critical edge in T1 or T2, we can, as be-
fore, show that by a careful choice of these vertices, building {v1, v2} reduces the
disconnection cost for v1 (and v2) to at most
n0
2 . Player v1 originally has disconnec-
tion cost n´ n0 ě n0, so she experiences an improvement of at least n02 . (Player v2
originally has disconnection cost n0, so she as well experiences an improvement
of at least n02 .) It follows n0 ď 2α and so sepmax = 2n0 (n´ n0) ď 4αn.
9.8 Theorem. The price of anarchy with a smart adversary is O(1).
Proof. Let c ą 0 be the constant from the “α = Ω(n)” statement of Lemma 9.7,
e. g., we may choose c := 16 . Consider first α ă cn. We use c as the constant in
the premise in Lemma 9.6. So if mmax ě 3, then Lemma 9.6 gives sepmax = O(nα).
Otherwise, if mmax P {1, 2}, Lemma 9.7 gives the same, since α ě cn is ruled out.
Since sepmax is the total disconnection cost, it so has a ratio ofO(1) to the optimum.
Corollary 9.4 ensures that the same holds for the building cost.
If α ě cn, then this and Corollary 9.4 allow us to invoke Corollary 6.2(ii).
9.9 Remark. The constant in Theorem 9.8 is bounded by 8+ 8n´1 = 8+ o(1).
Proof. We proceed as in the proof of the theorem, but do more detailed calculations.
Let c := 16 . We start again with α ă cn. If mmax ě 3, then Lemma 9.6 gives
sepmax ď 2 (1 + 9c) nα = 5nα. Otherwise, if mmax P {1, 2}, Lemma 9.7 gives
sepmax ď 4nα.
Next consider α ě cn, i. e., αc ě n. Using the trivial bound n
2 on the disconnec-
tion cost yields the αcn = 6nα bound on it.
In all cases disconnection cost is bounded by 6nα. Building cost is bounded by
2nα by Corollary 9.4. Finally invoking Remark 7.2 with c1 := 8 and c0 := 0 yields
a bound on the price of anarchy of 8+ 8n´1 .
10 Bilateral Link Formation
Recall that bilateral link formation (BLF) means that v requires w’s consent to
build {v,w}, and if they both agree, they pay α each. This is expressed by the
bilateral final graph GB = (V, EB(S)) with
EB(S) := {{v,w} ; Svw = 1^ Swv = 1} .
Social cost is C(S) = 2 |E(S)| α + ∑vPV Iv(G(S)), differing from the social cost
under ULF only in a factor 2 in building cost. Appropriate equilibrium concepts
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are PNE and PS. In general, the former implies the latter. The converse holds if
cost is convex.
Restricting to essential strategy profiles, individual and social cost are both
determined by the final graph, as are the properties of being a PNE or being PS.
Hence we will sometimes work with the final graph in place of a strategy profile.
Certain classes of simple-structured MaxNE under ULF are PNE under BLF.
The following two propositions hold in a more general setting, not limited to the
adversary model. Let S be a strategy profile. Define SB by SBvw := min {1, Svw+Swv}
for all v,w P V. Then GU(S) = GB(SB). In other words, forming SB means adding
to S the necessary requests so that for BLF the same final graph emerges as we
have for ULF.
10.1 Proposition. Let S be a MaxNE under ULF with G := GU(S) being a cycle and
using anonymous indirect cost. Then SB is a PNE under BLF.
Proof. By the definition of MaxNE, any additional link is an impairment for the
buyer. So the premise of (2.1) on page 9 is never true, i. e., all absent edges are
justified.
New edges cannot be formed unilaterally. We are hence left to show that each
edge is wanted by both endpoints, i. e., none of the endpoints can improve her
individual cost by deleting the edge. Let v be the owner of an edge {v,w} under
ULF. Since we have a NE there, v cannot improve her individual cost by selling
this edge. Selling the edge means that vwould be at the end of the path G´ {v,w}.
By anonymity of indirect cost we conclude: it is worth or at least no impairment
paying α for not being at the end of the path that results from G by deletion of one
edge. Therefore, both of each two neighboring vertices maintain their requests in
SB for having an edge between them.
10.2 Proposition. Let S be a MaxNE under ULF with G := GU(S) being a tree. Let the
indirect cost assign 8 to a disconnected graph. Then SB is a PNE under BLF.
Proof. As in the previous proposition, (2.1) follows from the properties of a MaxNE.
So we are left to consider removals. Since the final graph is a tree, removal of
any edge would make it disconnected, yielding indirect cost 8. Hence no player
wishes to remove an edge.
Now we turn to the adversary model. It follows from the two previous propo-
sitions that the equilibrium existence results from Proposition 7.3, Proposition 7.4,
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and Proposition 9.2 carry over fromMaxNE to PNE. Hence for anonymous discon-
nection cost, we have proved existence of PNE, and hence also PS graphs, under
BLF for all ranges of α and n ě 9.
Corollary 6.2 holds independently of the equilibrium concept. The cycle is
optimal for α ď n ´ 1 with social cost 2nα, and a star is optimal for α ě n ´
1 with social cost 2 (n ´ 1) (α + 1); so the optimum social cost is always Θ(nα).
Ranges for α and the exact expressions for the social cost are different from those in
Proposition 7.1, accounting for the factor 2 in building cost. Otherwise, arguments
are the same. It can be checked easily that Theorem 7.6 also carries over, to PNE
as well as PS.
Simple-Minded Adversary
We show that for the simple-minded adversary, cost is convex, hence PNE and PS
are equivalent. The following proposition is purely graph-theoretical.
10.3 Proposition. Let G = (V, E) be a connected graph, v P V a vertex, e = {v,w} P E
an edge, and F Ď Ez {e} a set of edges, each incident with v, so that G1 := G´ F´ e is
still connected. Let B1 be those edges that are non-bridges in G but bridges in G´ e. Let
B2 be those edges that are non-bridges in G´ F but bridges in G´ F´ e. Then B1 Ď B2.
Proof. Since G1 is connected, there is a path (v, e1, v1, . . . ,w) in G1. Then the cycle
C := (v, . . . ,w, e, v) is in G´ F. By Remark 8.2(ii), we have B1 Ď E(C). Hence all
edges in B1 are on a cycle that is not destroyed by removal of F, so no edge in B1
is made a bridge by removal of F. It follows B1 Ď B2.
10.4 Lemma. The simple-minded adversary induces convex cost.
Proof. Let v P V and w1, . . . ,wk P V and S be a strategy profile. We show (2.2)
on page 10 proceeding by induction on k. The case k = 1 is clear. Let k ą 1
and set S1 := S ´ (v,w1) ´ . . . ´ (v,wk´1). We show that switching from S1 to
S1 ´ (v,wk) increases disconnection cost for v at least as much as switching from
S to S ´ (v,wk). Since G(S1) has fewer edges than G(S), it suffices to consider
changes in relevance R(¨).
When removing {v,wk}, relevance of zero or more edges changes from 0 to
a positive value; these are precisely those edges which become bridges by the
removal and which were no bridges before. No relevance is reduced by removal
of edges.
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Let B1 be all those edges that become bridges by the switch from S to S ´
(v,wk), and let B2 those that become bridges by the switch from S1 to S1 ´ (v,wk).
Then B1 Ď B2 by Proposition 10.3. The increase in relevance from 0 to a positive
value for e P B1 given S1 is at least as high as when given S. In other words, while
{v,w1} , . . . , {v,wk´1} are removed, the effect of all edges in B1 becoming bridges
is saved until the removal of {v,wk}. We have shown that
Iv(S
1 ´ (v,wk))´ Iv(S1) ě Iv(S´ (v,wk))´ Iv(S) . (10.5)
The proof is concluded by the following standard calculation:
Iv(S´ (v,w1)´ . . .´ (v,wk))´ Iv(S)
= Iv(S
1 ´ (v,wk))´ Iv(S)
= Iv(S
1 ´ (v,wk))´ Iv(S) + Iv(S
1)´ Iv(S
1)
= Iv(S
1 ´ (v,wk))´ Iv(S1) + Iv(S1)´ Iv(S)
ě Iv(S´ (v,wk))´ Iv(S) + Iv(S
1)´ Iv(S) by (10.5)
ě Iv(S´ (v,wk))´ Iv(S) +
k´1
∑
i=1
(
Iv(S´ (v,wi))´ Iv(S)
)
by induction
=
k
∑
i=1
(
Iv(S´ (v,wi))´ Iv(S)
)
.
We restrict to the simpler concept of PS in the following study of the price of
anarchy, knowing that by convexity it is the same as PNE. Recall that we have
shown in Proposition 8.8 that a NE is chord-free. The proof does not fully carry
over to the bilateral case, since it contains an argument of the form “then the player
would rather build a different link instead.” Yet, we can use the idea of that proof
to show chord-freeness if α is not too small. For small α, we can show a bound on
the number of edges by a different simple argument.
10.6 Proposition. Let a pairwise stable graph G be given.
(i) If α ą 12 , then G is chord-free and hence by Proposition 8.10 only has 2n´1 = O(n)
edges.
(ii) In general, G is chord-free (with O(n) edges) or has at most n√
2α
+ 1 edges.
Proof. If G is bridgeless, selling a chord is beneficial since disconnection cost 0 is
maintained. So for both parts we assume that G contains bridges.
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Figure 7. Cycle with path attached, here n = 16 and ℓ = 4.
(i) The impairment in disconnection cost for a player v of selling a chord is only
due to the change in the denominator of the disconnection cost and is precisely
1
m (m´1) R(v), which is upper-bounded by
1
2 since R(v) ď
n (n´1)
2 . Hence if α is
larger than that, there is an incentive to sell the chord.
(ii) Let G possess a chord. This means that any of its two endpoints, say v,
deems it being no impairment to pay α for this edge, hence 1
m (m´1) R(v) ě α. It
follows n2
2
ě
n (n´ 1)
2
ě R(v) ě m (m´ 1) α ě (m´ 1)2 α ,
hence n√
2α
+ 1 ě m.
As for bounding disconnection cost, Lemma 8.13 is no longer true, but
Lemma 5.3 and its Corollary 8.12 is. If α ą 12 , we can at least show a bound
of O(1+
√
n/α) on the price of anarchy; we do not know whether it is tight. If
α ď 12 , we can show O(1+
√
n/α1.5).
10.7 Lemma.
(i) The diameter of the bridge tree of a PS graph is O (
√
nα) if α ą 12 and O
(√
n
√
α
)
if α ď 12 .
(ii) For α = 1, the bridge tree can have diameter Ω(
√
n), even if the graph is PS.
Proof. (i) Building an edge that puts a path in the bridge tree of length ℓ ě 1 on a
cycle brings to both endpoints at least the ∆R of that path alone, i. e., ∑ℓk=1 k =
ℓ (ℓ+1)
2 .
If α ą 12 , then the edge so brings an improvement in disconnection cost of at least
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1
m+1∆R ě
1
2n
ℓ (ℓ+1)
2 , so 4nα ě ℓ (ℓ+ 1) ě ℓ
2. We use the 2n´ 1 bound on the num-
ber of edges from Proposition 10.6(i) here. If α ď 12 , then by Proposition 10.6(ii) we
have an O
(
n√
α
)
bound on the number of edges, yielding ℓ = O
(√
n
√
α
)
along
the same lines.
(ii) Consider a cycle with a path of length ℓ attached to it with one of its ends,
as shown in Figure 7 on the preceding page. Let n be the total number of vertices
and let 1n
ℓ (ℓ+1)
2 ď α ď
1
n
((n´ℓ)´1) (n´ℓ)
2 ; such an α exists if n ě 3ℓ. The bridge tree
has diameter ℓ. Because of the lower bound on α, no vertex on the cycle wishes to
connect to a vertex on the path, and also no vertex on the path wishes to connect
to a vertex that is located away from the cycle. Because of the upper bound on α,
it can also be shown easily that no two neighboring vertices on the cycle wish to
sell the edge between them. Trivially, no edge on the path will be sold. Hence this
graph is PS. However, we can choose n ě 9, ℓ := ⌊√n⌋, and α := 1, and so have a
diameter of Ω(
√
n).
One might hope to find a lower bound matching O(1+
√
n/α) by the construc-
tion used in this proof. This is, however, not the case:
10.8 Remark. The example in Lemma 10.7(ii) does not prove a price of anarchy
beyond Θ(1).
Proof. The total disconnection cost is
1
n
2
ℓ
∑
k=1
(n´ k) k =
ℓ (ℓ+ 1)
n
(
n´
2ℓ+ 1
3
)
.
For a lower bound on the price of anarchy, we have to divide this by Θ(nα), so
we choose α as small as possible, i. e., α = 1n
ℓ (ℓ+1)
2 . Then we divide the total
disconnection cost by Θ(nα) = Θ(ℓ (ℓ + 1)) and receive a lower bound on the
price of anarchy of only
Θ
( 1
n
(
n´
2ℓ+ 1
3
))
= Θ
(
1´
2ℓ+ 1
3n
)
= O(1) .
10.9 Theorem. The price of anarchy for a simple-minded adversary with BLF and PS is
O(1+
√
n/α) if α ą 12 and O(1+
√
n/α1.5) otherwise.
Proof. By Proposition 10.6 building cost of a pairwise stable graph is O(nα) or
O(( n√
2α
+ 1) α), both having a ratio of O(1+ 1√
α
) to the optimum.
46
10. Bilateral Link Formation
x w
u
v
e1
f1
e2
f2
Figure 8. Example for a non-convex individual cost Cv. The dashed edge is critical. Since
the number of vertices on the cycle on the right is large enough, removal of ei makes fi
critical for each i P {1, 2}.
If α ą 12 , then by Lemma 10.7(i) and Corollary 8.12, disconnection cost of a
pairwise stable graph is O(n
√
nα), having a ratio of O(
√
n/α) to the optimum.
Otherwise, if α ď 12 , then disconnection cost is O
(
n
√
n
√
α
)
, having a ratio of
O (
√
n/α1.5) to the optimum.
Smart Adversary
We start again by considering convexity of cost. The difficulty with the smart
adversary is that its probability measure can change substantially when edges are
removed. Indeed, exploiting this feature we show that cost is not convex for the
smart adversary.
10.10 Proposition. Consider the graph in Figure 8 and the player v in it. Then Cv is not
convex, since
Cv(G´ e1 ´ e2)´ Cv(G) ă (Cv(G´ e1)´ Cv(G)) + (Cv(G´ e2)´ Cv(G)) .
Proof. Let k be the number of vertices on the cycle on the right. If k is large enough,
removal of ei makes fi critical, for each i P {1, 2}. Removing both e1 and e2 makes
f2 critical. Thus we have:
Cv(G´ e1)´ Cv(G) = 3´ 1´ α = 2´ α ,
Cv(G´ e2)´ Cv(G) = k´ 1´ α , and
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Cv(G´ e1 ´ e2)´ Cv(G) = k´ 1´ 2α .
So Cv(G´ e1)´ Cv(G) + Cv(G´ e2)´ Cv(G) = 2+ k´ 1´ 2α = k+ 1´ 2α, which
is strictly larger than k´ 1´ 2α by a difference of 2.
This result is only partly satisfactory, since non-convexity is not shown on the
set of PS strategy profiles. It remains unclear how to construct an example of a PS
graph that is not a PNE. In an attempt to make the example from Figure 8 PS, we
need α ď 1, or else u would sell {u,w}, which would make e1 critical. However,
then there is an incentive for x to put the critical edge on a cycle by building an
additional edge, and no potential partner can decline such a request.
Yet, this example provides evidence that the smart adversary is in some respect
a substantially different model than the sum-distance model or the simple-minded
adversary. For, these two have convex cost on the whole set of strategy profiles,
which the smart adversary has not.
Now we turn to the price of anarchy. Here again, the smart adversary provides
us with something new. The proof of Remark 9.3, showing that a NE is chord-free,
clearly carries over to the bilateral case and pairwise stability. This is easier com-
pared to the simple-minded adversary, where we had to prove Proposition 10.6.
Thus certainly we have the
O
(
1+
n
α
)
(10.11)
bound of Corollary 6.2(i), since chord-freeness is maintained. Can it be improved,
like in all the other cases studied before? The proofs of Lemma 9.6 and Lemma 9.7,
which are the basis for Theorem 9.8, are almost completely symmetric in v1 and
v2 and so at first appear to apply for BLF as well, which would have meant an
O(1) bound. The case of exactly one critical edge in Lemma 9.7, however, is not
symmetric and provides an idea to a counterexample: if there is only one critical
edge e0, then it can happen that vertices in the smaller component of G´ e0 wish
(desperately) to put e0 on a cycle, but they cannot find a partner in the other com-
ponent that is willing to cooperate. The following lower bound is tight by (10.11).
10.12 Theorem. Let n ě 9 and α ą 2, then the price of anarchy for PNE and PS with
the smart adversary is Ω(1+ nα ).
Proof. First assume there is an integer n0 ě 3 such that n = 3n0 ´ 2. Consider
three stars Si, i = 1, 2, 3 with center vertices ui, i = 1, 2, 3, and n0, n0´ 1, and n0´ 2
vertices, respectively. Connect the stars via an additional vertex u0 and additional
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u0
u1
u2
u3
Figure 9. Three stars of sizes n0, n0 ´ 1,
and n0 ´ 2; here n0 = 5. The n0 play-
ers in the star around u1 would like
to put the one critical edge on a cy-
cle, if α ă n0. Building, e. g., {u1, u2}
would reduce their disconnection cost
from n ´ n0 to n0 ´ 2, meaning an im-
provement of n0. But no player from
the stars around u2 or u3 is willing to
cooperate.
edges {u0, ui}, i = 1, 2, 3. This construction uses 3n0 ´ 2 vertices. See Figure 9 for
an illustration. Then e0 = {u0, u1} is the only critical edge and n0 = Θ(n), namely
slightly more than 13n. We have a total disconnection cost of 2ν(e0) (n´ ν(e0)) =
2n0 (n´ n0) = Ω(n2). We have a ratio to the optimum of Ω(1+ nα ). We are left to
show that this graph is a PNE, which implies PS. It is clear that no edge can be
sold, since that would make the graph disconnected. Therefore we only have to
ensure that no link can be added that would be beneficial for one endpoint and at
least no impairment for the other one, i. e., we have to show (2.1).
An edge e that improves disconnection cost for some player has to put {u0, u1}
on a cycle. If e connects a vertex in S1 with a vertex in S2, then {u0, u3} will become
critical. For a vertex in S2, this reduces disconnection cost from n0 to n0 ´ 2. So,
since α ą 2, no vertex in S2 agrees to build such an edge.
A similar situation holds if e connects a vertex in S1 with a vertex in S3 + u0.
It will result in {u0, u2} becoming critical. For a vertex in S3 + u0, this reduces
disconnection cost from n0 to n0 ´ 1. So, since α ą 1, no vertex in S3 + u0 agrees
to build such an edge.
If n+ 2 is not a multiple of 3, we can do a similar construction. We let n0 be
as large as possible so that n ě 3n0 ´ 2 and do the same construction as above.
The remaining 1 or 2 vertices are connected directly to u0. Then the previous
arguments essentially carry over.
If we consider α ą 2 a constant, then the previous theorem gives a lower bound
of Ω(n). For α = Ω(1) this is the worst that can happen for any adversary in this
model. Hence the ‘overall worst-case’ is attained by the smart adversary with BLF.
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